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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. OVERVIEW 
The Department of Defense (DoD) Acquisition System is part of a complex 
machine bureaucracy often criticized for failing to rapidly meet the needs of warfighters 
in a myriad of operational realms.1 For example, the Missile Defense Agency conducts 
testing of its Ballistic Missile Defense System with the intended outcome of defending 
the United States from external missile attack. Each missile test requires hundreds of 
trained personnel, coordination among geographically dispersed agencies and commands, 
target vehicles, interceptors, a plethora of sensors, dedicated airspace, and command and 
control oversight. All of these human and mechanical assets, parts, and pieces interact 
with the unified purpose of shooting-down (disrupting) incoming (ballistic) missiles.  
Despite considerable resources and some success, it is generally regarded that 
overall missile defense performance is well-short of the vision promulgated by former 
President Reagan in the early 1980s. One reality is that the missile defense shield in 
development since 1985, is still incomplete, and its total estimated costs may reach 
$107B by the end of 2007.2 In other words, the Defense Acquisition System designed to 
bolster missile defense operational effectiveness within reasonable costs has apparently 
missed its mark over the past 25 years.  
Admittedly, network centric acquisition programs such as missile defense are 
monumentally complicated on numerous technical levels, expectedly expensive and take 
decades to develop. Nevertheless, this example may be emblematic of the Defense 
Acquisition System’s questionable results to fully meet warfighter requirements and 
procurement objectives for its numerous programs. Hence the persistent criticisms. For 
additional examples, look to other DoD flagship programs such as Joint Strike Fighter 
(JSF), Air Force F/A-22 Raptor, and Army Future Combat System (FSC). The outcries 
                                                 
1 Marshall Engelbeck, “MN3331 Principles of Acquisition Management,” (Lecture at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 1st Quarter, 2007). 
2 Department of Defense, “Historical Funding for MDA FY85-07,” Missile Defense Agency, 
http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/pdf/histfunds.pdf (accessed on November 24, 2007). 
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seem so similar: escalating costs, schedule delays, inefficiency and ineffectiveness, and 
procurement of systems that may not do what they have been designed to do.3  
Indeed, the Defense Acquisition System appears to continue to under perform 
despite revisionist initiatives and multiple studies in search of improvement over the past 
two decades.4 Many would probably concede that a sea-change in acquisition affairs may 
be needed to make it markedly responsive to warfighter requirements. Consequently, 
well-intentioned reformers steadfastly search for the silver bullet—or at least a few 
golden nuggets to shift the system toward value-added change.   
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the Defense Acquisition System through 
the theoretical foundation of systems thinking, thereby acting to discover areas for 
improvement relevant to acquisition leaders and managers endeavoring to accomplish 
mandated acquisition reform, particularly in terms of meeting warfighter procurement 
requirements for major Defense programs. Short explanations of a warfighter and the 
Defense Acquisition System follow. 
1. Warfighter 
The term warfighter is a DoD colloquialism, which generally refers to a member 
of the uniformed Armed Services serving and fighting under America’s flag.5 However, 
this study interprets a warfighter to be anyone within the DoD—not just the military—
that might seek to procure products and services through the Defense Acquisition 
System. In other words, warfighters are key stakeholders of the system, as they largely 
identify and filter battle space capabilities and requirements, fund programs, and closely 
monitor schedules, especially for high cost Major Defense Acquisition Programs 
(MDAP) or Major Automated Information Systems (MAIS).  
                                                 
3 Robert G. Struth Jr., “Systems Engineering and the Joint Strike Fighter: The Flagship Program for 
Acquisition Reform,” Acquisition Review Quarterly (Summer 2000): 221. 
4 Gordon England, “Acquisition Action Plan,” (Department of Defense memorandum from Acting 
Deputy Secretary of Defense, June 7, 2005).  
5 Wikipedia the Free Encyclopedia, “Warfighter,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/warfighter (accessed on 
November 24, 2007. 
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2. Defense Acquisition System 
The focus of this study is on the Defense Acquisition System. DoD Directive 
5000.1 The Defense Acquisition System defines the system as “the management process 
by which the Department of Defense provides effective, affordable, and timely systems to 
the users.”6 The Defense Acquisition System is an organizationally driven process 
intended to seamlessly work with the Joint Capabilities, Integration and Development 
System (JCIDS) and Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPB&E) 
process, whereby all three components serve as Decision Support Systems within the 
overarching Integrated Defense Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Life Cycle 
Management Framework (Figure 1.1).7  
 
 
Figure 1.1. Decision Support Systems of the Defense Acquisition Framework 
(Source: Defense Acquisition Guidebook, 2003) 
 
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) lays emphasis on the 
interrelationships between the Decision Support Systems: “To produce weapon systems 
                                                 
6 Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System, May 13, 2003. 
7 Integrated Defense Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Life Cycle Management Framework, ver 
5.2, August 2005. 
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that provide the capabilities our warfighters need, these three processes must be aligned 
to ensure consistent decisions are made.”8 JCIDS “identifies, assesses, and prioritizes” 
joint warfighting procurement capabilities and needs per Title 10, United States Code 
prior to feeding the Defense Acquisition System with requirements.9 In theory, JCIDS 
“racks and stacks” acquisition initiatives, as it acts as the gatekeeper to the Defense 
Acquisition System. The PPB&E process is governed by DoD Financial Management 
Regulation 7000.14-R and helps allocate resources. It intertwines with the Defense 
Acquisition System by way of Congressional budgeting cycles and money classifications 
such as Research and Development (R&D), Procurement, and Operations and 
Maintenance (O&M). 
C. BENEFITS 
This study yields notable system improvement opportunities for the Defense 
Acquisition System, and it provides corresponding recommendations for acquisition 
leaders, i.e., Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics (USD (AT&L)), particularly with systemic issues associated with Management 
and Fit, Learning, Handling of Input Variability, and Differentiation of Tasks and 
Workflows. The following offers a snapshot of this study's findings. 
1. Management and Fit 
Current applications of strategies and governing policies, i.e., promulgations of 
certain key success factors and system direction, may not fit with the overarching 
character and identity of the Defense Acquisition System, given that it is endemically tied 
to the DoD's large, complex, machine-like bureaucracy and susceptible to the whims of 
its culture and environmental context.  
                                                 
8 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01F, Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System, May 1, 2007. 
9 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01F, Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System, May 1, 2007. 
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2. Learning 
The system collectively shows indications of not being able to interpret, filter, and 
learn from feedback, i.e., previous mistakes, mainly due to the system's repeated, 
unintended outcomes of cost overruns, schedule delays, and occasional poor performance 
of resulting products and services delivered to the warfighter. 
3. Handling of Input Variability 
 It looks as if the system experiences tremendous difficulty coping with input 
variability, ironically stemming from potentially ill-fitted strategies designed to adapt to 
the warfighter’s changing requirements, technological advances, and potent external 
forces from the system's environment.  
4. Differentiation of Tasks and Workflows 
The system appears to foster disorder with tasks and workflows, specifically due 
to inadequate differentiation of system functions and corresponding interrelationships, 
which may be further exacerbated by ad hoc organizational structures, i.e., horizontally 
matrixed product teams.  
D. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This study follows a logical order: Chapter II establishes the foundational tools 
for analysis; Chapter III conducts the analysis of the Defense Acquisition System; and 
Chapter IV provides conclusions and recommendations. 
Chapter II establishes and describes the theoretical foundations and models for 
this analysis. Particularly, a short introduction to systems theory establishes the 
groundwork for the larger discussion of open, organizational systems. Descriptions of the 
basic elements of open systems follow and serve as a prelude to the more tailored 
organizational systems model coined by Nancy Roberts (1998), which is the primary 
analytical tool for this study. Chapter II also interweaves organizational configurations, 
common coordination activities, and basic management approaches, i.e., degree of 
efficiency and effectiveness, to supplement a greater systems approach. 
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Chapter III conducts an analysis of the Defense Acquisition System and compares 
it to the key components of the Roberts organizational systems model. Specifically, this 
chapter focuses on the Defense Acquisition System’s environmental context, key success 
factors, system direction, design factors, culture, outputs, and outcomes. Using the model 
brings the highly complex Defense Acquisition System into focus, as it elucidates 
important system internal and external relationships. 
Chapter IV offers conclusions and recommendations based on the holistic 
interrelationships between the following: Defense Acquisition System; systems theory; 
organizational structures, configurations, approaches, and frameworks; and the Roberts 
organizational systems model.  






II. ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEMS THEORY 
This chapter establishes and describes the theoretical foundations, configurations, 
and models used for analysis in Chapter III. Particularly, a brief introduction to systems 
theory establishes an underpinning for the larger discussion of open, organizational 
systems. Explanations of the basic elements of open systems, i.e., inputs, throughput, 
outputs, feedback, and the environment, prologue the more tailored Roberts 
organizational systems model, which is the chief analytical tool for this study. The 
Roberts model evaluates environmental context, key success factors, system direction, 
design factors, culture, outputs, and outcomes. This chapter also addresses relevant 
organizational configurations, common coordination activities, and basic management 
approaches, i.e., degree of efficiency and effectiveness, to augment a systems approach.      
A.  SYSTEMS THEORY 
 1. Systems 
The basic definition of a system is a set of interrelated and interdependent 
elements, concrete or abstract, that interact together to make up the system’s whole for a 
common purpose.10 The weather, a car, the human body, a business organization, a web 
site, a network, and a power plant are all examples of systems. Each system is made up of 
the necessary components that comprise the system, but “the whole is greater than the 
sum of its parts.”11 In less conceptual terms, one “can only understand the system of a 
rainstorm by contemplating the whole, not any individual part of the pattern.”12 Hence, a 
systems approach is both grounded in everyday forces and examples, and evokes the 
comprehensive logic of viewing a system in its entirety.  
                                                 
10 Francis Heylighen, Cliff Joslyn, and Valentin Turchin, “System,” Principia Cybernetica Web, 
http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/asc/SYSTEM.html (accessed on November 24, 2007). 
11 Kenneth R. Westphal, Hegel’s Epistemology: A Philosophical Introduction to the Phenomenology 
of Spirit (Indianapolis: Hacket Publishing, 2003), 111.  
12 Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization (New 
York: Currency Doubleday, 1990), 7. 
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Without all of the integral pieces to a system, however—even losing or changing 
one key variable—the system may not live up to its full potential. For example, an Air 
Force fueling operations system is made up of the major components of storage tanks, 
pipelines, underground hydrants, drivers, fuel trucks, filling stations, accounting 
personnel, hydrant servicing vehicles, laboratory technicians, and a number of other 
elements. All of the components exist within this system for the common purpose of 
providing fuel services to Air Force aircraft on the base’s flight line. If one were to 
remove the filling stations from this particular system, for instance, the fuel trucks would 
not be able to receive fuel. Consequently, as an example, the fueling operations system 
would not have the means to provide fuel to aircraft parked at hardstand locations without 
access to underground hydrants. Note the criticality of all the parts to this simplistic 
representation of a system. The fuel trucks heavily rely on the filling stations for fuel, 
which illustrates their importance and interconnectedness within the system.    
2. General System Theory        
Indeed, appreciating the interrelationships among diverse and dynamic (moving) 
elements is a necessary building block for thinking and acting in systems terms. One only 
needs to consider Egyptian, Inca, and other societies and philosophers such as Plato and 
Aristotle to know people of antiquity understood and pondered systems. In Facets of 
Systems Science, George Klir quotes French philosopher, Henri Poincaré, who plainly 
exclaimed, “The aim of science is not things themselves…but the relations between 
things; outside those relations there is no reality knowable.”13 The famous German 
philosopher, Friedrich Hegel, also mused over systems and is credited with highlighting 
the existence of dynamic relationships between system components.  
However, it took until the middle of the 20th century before there was a major 
breakthrough in the theory of systems. In 1947 Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s General System 
Theory provided a leap forward. The Austrian biologist studied systems with the intent of 
understanding the underlying principles of the relationships between components and the 
                                                 
13 George J. Klir, Facets of Systems Science, 2nd Edition, (New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum 
Publishers: 2001), 3. 
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external environment of a system, which would eventually reveal the “law of laws” 
beyond the traditional sciences of chemistry, physics, biology, mechanics and the like.14 
In fact, he believed such dynamics were not only definable but also attributable to all 
systems, regardless of their purpose. In essence, his vision of a system widened the lens 
of how a system is viewed.   
Nonetheless, Bertalanffy’s notion of systems thinking was counter to 
conventional approaches at the time, which held component-level analysis in high esteem 
and asserted the totality of the system was simply the linear addition of all the 
components.15 Such an analysis of a system was mostly wrong, as Bertalanffy 
reconfigured previous systems theories. He essentially took systems thinking a step 
further and chartered an unprecedented, holistic view of systems that went beyond 
reductionism and mechanism, thus offering a “new paradigm for transdisciplinary 
synthesis.”16 In the plainest of words, in order to understand a system, one has to 
interpret the system as a whole body—not just the individual pieces that make up the 
system. People may have understood the presence and even importance of systems, but 
Bertalanffy is credited with offering insight into how to study them. 
The results of Bertalanffy’s General System Theory exponentially expanded 
systems thought in the middle of the 20th century, as he opened the floodgates for studies 
of open systems. Prior to his era, most of the conversations about systems revolved 
around closed systems, which were systems separately considered from their external 
environment. Theorists primarily concentrated on the concrete relationships within a 
particular system instead of accounting for exposure to outside influences. General 




                                                 
14 Lars Skyttner, General Systems Theory: Ideas & Applications (New Jersey: World, 2001), 34. 
15 David S. Walonick, “General Systems Theory,” Statpac, http://www.survey-software-
solutions.com/walonick/systems-theory.htm (accessed on November 24, 2007). 
16 Ervin Laszlo, “Perspectives on General System Theory: A Collection of Essays,” International 
Society for the Systems Sciences, http://www.isss.org/laszlofw.htm (accessed on November 24, 2007). 
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open systems. As a result, Bertalanffy is frequently credited with jumpstarting the 
immature discipline of systems engineering, which has only been around for 
approximately fifty years.17 
B. ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEMS 
1. Open Systems 
Real advancements in systems thinking occurred when theorists piggybacked on 
Bertalanffy’s General System Theory and applied open systems knowledge to 
organizations. Such theorists more heavily accounted for a system’s abstract influences 
and external effects on an organizational system from its interaction with the 
environment, inputs, and other systems. A modern day professor straightforwardly 
describes this fact: “An open system organization is not passive…it reaches out and tries 
to shape the environment, yet at times, it is at the mercy of the environment.”18 This new 
aperture to view organizational systems prudently widened the context, and, more 
importantly, acknowledged relationships with the open environment as being just as 
critical—if not more critical—as the interrelationships within the system.19 
The Air Force fuels operations system example mentioned earlier sheds some 
light on the phenomenon of open systems and an organization. Although it was 
previously described as a closed system, there was one revelation in the scenario that 
qualifies it as an open system. For instance, the fact an aircraft is parked at a hardstand 
without an underground hydrant outlet is not within the control of the fuels operations 
system. Rather, the location of where to park the aircraft is likely a decision made by 
ground control personnel—which is an uncontrollable influence external to the system. 
As a consequence, this unruly circumstance from the environment negatively affects 
fueling operations by forcing the system to use trucks for refueling the aircraft instead of 
                                                 
17 Tom Huynh, “SE4011 Systems Engineering for Acquisition Managers,” (Lecture at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 3rd Quarter, 2007). 
18 Tom O’Conner, “Foundations of Organizational Theory” North Carolina Westleyan College, 
http://faculty.ncwc.edu/TOCONNOR/417/417lect01.htm (accessed on November 24, 2007). 
19 Francis Heylighen, “Basic Concepts of the Systems Approach” Principia Cybernetica Web, October 
4, 1998, http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/SYSAPPR.html (accessed on November 24, 2007). 
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taking advantage of its faster and more efficient hydrant fueling system. Admittedly, the 
Air Force fueling operations system is able to adapt to its openness, in this case, but the 
bottom line is the system’s openness forced it to interact and adjust accordingly. Hence, 
the system is not closed and fenced off from outside pressures. 
2. Basic Components of Open Systems 
An open system is most basically represented as an interaction of inputs, 
throughput, outputs, and feedback that exists within an environment.20 Figure 2.1 shows 
the open system’s rudimentary components as rectangles and their relationships with 
directional arrows. This simple illustration of an Input Process Output (IPO) model helps 
establish a foundational understanding of open systems prior to getting into a more 
complex representation later in the study, e.g., Roberts’ organizational systems model. 
Roberts' version builds upon the representation in Figure 2.1, and introduces more 









 Figure 2.1. Basic Elements of Open Systems (Source: Heylighen, 1998) 
                                                 
20 Francis Heylighen, “Basic Concepts of the Systems Approach” Principia Cybernetica Web, October 
4, 1998, http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/SYSAPPR.html (accessed on November 24, 2007). 
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a. Inputs 
Some system inputs originate from the external environment, e.g., book 
order information from Amazon.com customers ordering online, fuel for storage tanks to 
supply Air Force facilities and operations, school children entering a school, and food 
and water humans ingest to sustain a hierarchy of systems in the human body. Inputs can 
be concrete or abstract in nature, and of course, all systems require inputs to survive.21  
Inputs also include how organizational leaders set-direction, i.e., through mission, vision, 
goals, strategies and policies 
 b. Throughput 
Throughput is essentially the heart of the system’s processing. Ideally, this 
is where value-added activity occurs between the system’s internal elements and inputs 
received, transforming inputs into some other state or result such as goods and services.22 
Continuing the Amazon.com example, the mega online company processes orders 
through its information processing system to turn requests into sold and delivered books 
to customers. Amazon.com might use the following resources to accomplish its goals: 
computers, software, people or employees including their training, experience and 
knowledge, databases, inventory facilities, books, accounting and payroll processes, and 
other relevant factors. These resources or variables interact and generate various results. 
Throughput variables matter and can be referred to as organizational design or 
architecture.23 System design is crucial for two important reasons: 1) managers and 
senior executives on net, have substantial control over their design variables, e.g., 
changing to a new technology, or controlling how many employees with what skills are 
hired; and 2) the extent to which the variables fit determines performance, i.e., 
overarching systems hypothesis.  
                                                 
21 Cary Simon, “GB3010 Managing for Organizational Effectiveness,” (Lecture at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 4th Quarter, 2006). 
22 Derek R Lane, “Chapter 4: Systems Theory,” University of Kentucky, www.uky.edu/~drlane/ 
orgcomm /325ch04.ppt (accessed on November 24, 2007). 
23 Cary Simon, “GB3010 Managing for Organizational Effectiveness,” (Lecture at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 4th Quarter, 2006). 
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 c. Outputs 
Outputs are typically tangible goods and services, e.g., how many books 
sold per time period, freshly lathed and finished baseball bats, numbers of graduate 
students obtaining Master’s degrees, or numbers of aircraft refueled. Outputs are one type 
of result, another result being outcomes, defined as intended and unintended 
consequences of the outputs.24  This result plus organizational culture as an emergent 
variable are discussed later in the study.  
 d. Feedback 
Feedback is one of the elements of an open system that loops back to let 
the system know how it is performing. Feedback acts as a regulator or controller of the 
system, as the system interprets feedback in a positive or negative context. Positive 
feedback reinforces the system’s existing behavior, and negative feedback, alternatively, 
informs the system that it is functioning poorly and that adjustments are needed, i.e., 
become dehydrated enough and the feedback loop within the body demands water, or 
death. Healthy systems are able to accommodate feedback by making internal 
adjustments to the system. 
 e. Environment 
The external environment includes abstract and concrete factors, forces 
and trends, particularly those having potential organizational impacts, e.g., rising gas 
prices for an Air Force, or CNN pictures of a dysfunctional government organization, 
e.g., the Federal Emergency Management Agency's poor response in Hurricane Katrina. 
Additionally, theorists claim that organizational systems will entropy—or randomly 
deteriorate over time—without interaction with the environment.25 This state of negative 
                                                 
24 Cary Simon, “GB3010 Managing for Organizational Effectiveness,” (Lecture at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 4th Quarter, 2006). 
25 Anthony A. Verstraete, “Systems Approach and IPO Model,” Penn State University, http:// 
www.smeal.psu/misweb/systems/sycoipo.html (last accessed on February 28, 2002). 
 14
entropy would need to be continually addressed through new inputs such as information, 
energy, and materials to avoid “increasing levels of disorder” within the system.26 
3. Complexity and Boundaries 
All open systems contain various inputs, throughputs, outputs and feedback loops, 
and all are exposed—more or less—to external environmental forces, i.e., factors 
impacting an organization over which it may have little to no control. Consider the 
complexity implied in this modern definition of systems theory and open systems by 
Heylighen and Joslyn;  
It is the transdisciplinary study of the abstract organization of phenomena, 
independent of their substance, type, or spatial or temporal scale of 
existence…investigating both the principles common to all complex 
entities, and the (usually mathematical) models which can be used to 
describe them.27  
What is apparent from this metaphysical explanation is how improbable it is to perfectly 
characterize open, organizational systems—or even precisely parse out and differentiate 
between the components described in Figure 2.1. In simpler words, how might one 
feasibly go about studying an “abstract organization of phenomena” in an organizational 
system, as described above?28   
In short, the permutations of open systems are complex, based on hierarchies of 
interacting systems (a transportation system) and semi-permeable boundaries separating 
inside the organization from outside the organization. In the previously mentioned fueling 
operations system, the filling station is its own system even though it is a subsystem 
within the fueling operations system. Furthermore, the trucks and hydrant servicing 
vehicles are interacting subsystems within larger and more complex transportation and 
Defense systems. Hence, systems may not be mutually exclusive from one another, 
meaning there are innumerable combinations to ponder. This unavoidable reality is why 
                                                 
26 Robert C.H. Chia, In the Realm of Organization: Essays for Robert Cooper (London: Routledge 
Books, 1998), 207. 
27 Francis Heylighen and Cliff Joslyn, “What is Systems Theory?” Principia Cybernetica Web, 
November 1, 1992, http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/SYSTHEOR.html (accessed on November 24, 2007). 
28 Ibid. 
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the potential confusion brought on by the openness of organizational systems warrants 
additional explanation regarding how to cope with the complexity of system boundaries. 
Cope is the key word because there is no magic formula for establishing 
boundaries with open, organizational systems. J.W. Gibbs offers a blunt perspective of 
this situation with his definition of a system, which affirms the genuineness of how one is 
forced to deal with system blends and perimeters. He claims, “A system is any portion of 
the material universe which we choose to separate in thought from the rest of the universe 
for the purpose of considering and discussing the various changes, which may occur 
within it under various conditions.”29 Admittedly, Gibbs confines his definition to the 
material world, but his point about the selection of system perimeters is still relevant to 
organizational systems.  
The division of organizational systems—whether nature-driven, concrete, or 
abstract—from one another for the purpose of understanding a single system is not a 
natural occurrence. Some organizational systems are more difficult to characterize and 
bind than other organizational systems. The Defense Acquisition System, for example, is 
substantially more difficult to isolate and analyze than a mom and pop dining system, for 
instance. Each organizational system is different in size and type, which supports the no 
set formula claim. 
Gibbs’ definition states a fundamental truth: people, for the purpose of analysis, 
effectively provide the lines of segregation for systems through their own choosing. As a 
result, there is no alternative but to somehow muddle through system complexities and 
variables by acknowledging the plethora of possible interactions within and outside the 
system. One bottom line is for analysts to attempt to logically isolate the system in 
question prior to accounting for the system’s external influences. Doing this may 
facilitate a cleaner delineation between a system and its environment, thereby 
encouraging a more credible analysis of the relationship between the two.  
                                                 
29 Jack Ring, “Are New Principles Required to Treat Enterprises as Systems?” (Position statement for 
the International Council on Systems Engineering, June 26, 2007). 
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4. Systems and Configurations 
Since organizational systems can be inherently complex and challenging to bind, 
a framework or model can facilitate a baseline for comprehension.30 Again, Gibbs’ 
realistic depiction of a system warrants model formulation. If as previously explained 
organizations can have porous and ill-defined boundaries, then one is faced with 
important decisions, i.e., how to include WalMart’s subcontractors and logistical 
pipelines with vendors as part of its organizational system, or how to incorporate 
Amazon.com's online advertising partnerships with Google?  
Henry Mintzberg, a renowned business and management researcher, scholar and 
theorist, offers a framework for understanding and analyzing organizations through his 
portrayal of five organizational configurations. A configuration includes a cluster of 
internal and external (situational) variables. Mintzberg’s representation starts at the top of 
a typical organizational hierarchy termed the strategic apex, followed by another 
structural component termed the middle line, continuing down into the operating core.  
Two additional side components include a technostructure and support staff.31  
Figure 2.2 provides an illustration of Mintzberg’s basic components. It is 
important to note that the proportions of these five structural elements change along with 
changes in organizational size, type, and situational factors. The strategic apex and 
indeed the other four components are all relatively large in a typical machine 
bureaucracy, e.g., McDonalds, United States Post Office, and the DoD. In sum, machine 
bureaucracies tend to require relatively large groupings of all five different kinds of 
generalized employees designed for predictable, standardized work processes. 
 
 
                                                 
30 Francis Heylighen, “Basic Concepts of the Systems Approach,” Principia Cybernetica Web, 
October 14, 1998, http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/SYSAPPR.html (accessed on November 24, 2007). 
31 Henry Mintzberg, Mintzberg on Management: Inside Our Strange World of Organizations (New 











Figure 2.2. Mintzberg’s Machine Bureaucracy (Source: Mintzberg, 1989)  
 
Mintzberg also speaks to five common mechanisms necessary for organizational 
coordination: 1) Mutual Adjustment, 2), Direct Supervision, 3) Standardization of Work 
Processes, 4) Standardization of Work Output, and 5) Standardization of Skills and 
Knowledge.32 These common mechanisms of coordination become particularly useful in 
evaluating the throughput capabilities and control mechanisms within an organization. 
Mintzberg’s structures and coordinating mechanisms provide a useful platform for 
analyzing the Defense Acquisition System. His configurations are used as a supplemental 
model different than but complementary to the organizational systems model.  
C. ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEMS MODEL  
The discussion now focuses on the primary organizational systems model 
developed or finalized by Roberts (1998), which is more detailed than the basic IPO 
model shown in Figure 2.1. Roberts' model (Figure 2.3) adds some key variables and uses 
language more helpful for practitioners and leaders contemplating organizational system 
interventions. Explanations of each of the model's components follow. 
 
                                                 
32 Henry Mintzberg, Mintzberg on Management: Inside Our Strange World of Organizations (New 
York: The Free Press, 1989), 104. 
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Figure 2.3. Organizational Systems Model (Source: Bruner, 1998) 
 
1. Environmental Context 
The organizational systems model illustrates a generalized direction starting with 
the environmental context that may impact an organization. The external environment 
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contains threats, opportunities, stakeholders and other raw materials needed to sustain an 
organization, e.g., political, economic, social, and technological.33  
2. Key Success Factors 
Key success factors refer to the main things an organization must do to compete 
and thrive in its respective domain or industry—not always an easy thing to discern. 
Andrew Carnegie, the famous steel tycoon who migrated from Scotland and settled in the 
United States, once said, “I believe that the true road to preeminent success in any line is 
to make yourself master of that line.”34 One could surmise how some organizations spend 
considerable resources trying to figure out the few key things they must excel in to 
succeed, especially while environmental forces continually shift and change. Evidence 
suggests that success factors for public organizations including Defense are greater in 
number and more ambiguous than private-based organizational factors.35 
3. System Direction 
The model’s flow continues to a primary input variable, which can be called the 
first charge of leadership: to set system direction. Typically, organizational leaders set 
system direction through goals, mission, vision, policies and strategic plans. Since the 
systems hypothesis says that the fit of the variables determines performance, then the 
direction of the organization would need to fit external factors, and the design variables 
would need to fit each other and fit the organization’s direction. The notion of fit is that 





                                                 
33 Anthony A. Verstraete, “Systems Approach and IPO Model,” Penn State University, http:// 
www.smeal.psu/misweb/systems/sycoipo.html (last accessed on February 28, 2002). 
34 Andrew Carnegie, “Success,” http://www.dailyinspiringquotes.com/successtwo.shtml (accessed 
November 24, 2007). 
35 Bradley D. Bruner, “An Organizational Analysis of the Military (Navy) Personnel Plans and Policy 
Division,” (Masters thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, September 1998), 10. 
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congruence. The overall challenge, therefore, is recognizing and differentiating external 
factors and forces, and setting a system direction that fits or is aligned with these 
powerful forces.36  
4. Design Factors 
Design factors come next, which are sometimes alluded to as the “black box of 
management."37 Although the organizational system attempts to embody its key success 
factors and set system direction, it is the manipulation of the system’s design factors that 
most directly shape the system’s results: culture, outputs, and outcomes. Hence, the 
design factors component happens to be one of the most critical aspects of any 
organizational system. Also called an organization’s architecture, design factor variables 
include technology, people, tasks, structure and processes.  
a. Tasks 
Tasks address the basic activities occurring within an organizational 
system. Filling a storage tank is an example of a task required of a fuels operations 
system. This factor includes delineating specifications of each task as well as 
differentiating between the tasks. For instance, the amount of fuel required to fill up the 
storage tank addresses the specification, and the fact this activity is separate from filling 
up a truck’s fuel tank addresses differentiation. 
b. Technology 
Technology refers to how an organization accomplishes its primary 
workflow, integral for converting inputs to desired results.38 Technology can be described  
 
 
                                                 
36 Raymond E. Miles, Charles C. Snow, Alan D. Meyer, and Henry J. Coleman, Jr., “Organizational 
Strategy, Structure, and Process,” The Academy of Management Review Vol. 3 No. 3 (July 1978): 546-562. 
37 Cary Simon, “GB3010 Managing for Organizational Effectiveness,” (Lecture at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 4th Quarter, 2006). 
38 Daniel Robey, Designing Organizations: A Macro Perspective (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. 
Irwin, 1982), 98. 
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in terms of the degree of interdependence or interrelationships needed to accomplish the 
work, i.e., greater interdependencies require different kinds of technologies or workflows 
between tasks.  
c. Structure 
Structure is a basic building block of all organizations, ranging from 
simple family-owned business structures, to fundamental differences between machine 
and organic structures, e.g., machine and professional bureaucracies in the former and 
matrix and "boundaryless" structures in the later.39 The central hypothesis is the same. 
The extent to which an organization’s structure fits other design variables, including its 
direction and success factors, determines performance. Discontinuity among and between 
variables can generate cultural conflicts and systemic problems, which translates into 
poor or degraded organizational performance, especially in large, complex public 
agencies and bureaus.40 
d. People 
Understanding the background, capabilities, and experience of people 
working within the organizational system is a significant design factor. Specifically, 
organizational leaders should account for the knowledge, skill, and ability of personnel 
within the organization. 
e. Processes/Subsystems 
Processes/Subsystems is a design factor that contains three main 
categories, but includes an organization’s reward process as well: 1) Human Resource 
Management, 2) Measurement and Controls to include Financial Management, and 3) 
Planning, Communication, and Information Management.  
                                                 
39 Cary Simon, “GB3010 Managing for Organizational Effectiveness,” (Lecture at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 4th Quarter, 2006). 
40 Cary Simon, “GB3010 Managing for Organizational Effectiveness,” (Lecture at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 4th Quarter, 2006). 
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Human Resource Management typically includes recruiting, hiring, 
promotion and other policies, generally reflecting the management of people. Important 
questions include: How does the organization recruit and select the right people for 
current and future needs? How does the organization determine who to promote and who 
to let go? How does the organization provide adequate training and motivation? Answers 
to these types of questions are relevant when considering Human Resource Management. 
Recognition, punishment and reward factors are also applicable.41 
Measurements and Controls, which includes Financial Management and 
oversight of the organizational system’s budget, relates to how people are held 
accountable for their actions and resources, i.e., rules and regulations or laws. Examples 
in this area also include pay and benefits and the quality of computers provided to 
personnel. The idea is to ensure that measurement and control policies and actions serve 
to generate the desired effects, both financially and culturally.  
Planning, Communication, and Information Management includes how 
the organization plans, communicates, and converts data and information into usable 
knowledge. Communication technologies can contribute or degrade actual 
communication, i.e., using a hand-held device to communicate with other employees 
while simultaneously participating in a group meeting. This may help or hinder 
information management methodologies, which includes gathering, processing, 
distributing and evaluating information. 
5. Results (Culture, Outputs, and Outcomes) 
Interestingly and crucial to the model are three forms of organizational results, or 
emergent variables: culture, outputs and outcomes. Organizational culture refers to 
behaviors, language, repeated patterns, and an accepted view of how things generally get 
done. Cultural value differences can require conflict management and resolution 
practices. Outputs typically refer to the goods and services produced by the 
organizational system. Additionally, outputs are closely connected to what is typically 
                                                 
41 Bradley D. Bruner, “An Organizational Analysis of the Military (Navy) Personnel Plans and Policy 
Division,” (Masters thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, September 1998), 12. 
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referred to as an organization’s ability to perform, i.e., generate desired goods or services, 
which then generate intended or unintended consequences, called outcomes.42 An 
example of an unintended outcome is an auto manufacturer that produces a car that is 
rejected by the general public, as revealed by poor sales revenue. On the other hand, an 
intended outcome would be a highly desired or improved mode of transportation.     
D. EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS 
The discussion of organizational systems thus far has centered on system 
attributes and mechanics with only implicit references to efficiency and effectiveness—
which are often times considered key success factors of systems. How efficiency and 
effectiveness are defined matters because they are different, even opposing concepts. 
Efficiency means the minimal amount of energy and resources used to accomplish a 
task.43 Effectiveness refers to bringing about a desired end state, including adapting to a 
changing external environment.44  
Ostroff and Schmidt define efficiency and effectiveness and provide a useful 
description of the relationship between the two factors:  
Efficiency and effectiveness are performance domains that have been 
clearly distinguished. Efficiency refers to an input-output ratio or 
comparison, whereas effectiveness refers to an absolute level of either 
input acquisition or output attainment (Pennings & Goodman, 1977). 
Although the best performing organizations are both effective and 
efficient (Katz & Kahn, 1978), there may be tradeoffs between the two 
(Mahoney, 1988). Progression along one performance dimension could 
entail regression along another (Kopelman, Brief, & Guzzo, 1990). Thus, 
an organization can be effective, efficient, both, or neither.45 
 
                                                 
42 Nancy Roberts, “The System Model,” Naval Postgraduate School, unpublished, 1998. 
43 Wiktionary Open Content Dictionary, “Efficiency,” http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/efficiency 
(accessed on October 23, 2007). 
44 Bradley D. Bruner, “An Organizational Analysis of the Military (Navy) Personnel Plans and Policy 
Division,” (Masters thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, September 1998), 15. 
45 Cheri Ostroff and Neal Schmitt, “Configurations of Organizational Effectiveness and Efficiency,”  
The Academy of Management Journal Vol. 36 No. 6 (Dec 1993): 1345-1361. 
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One essential distinction is solving the paradox inherent between the two terms, i.e., is it 
best to be streamlined and lean with no waste (highly efficient), or is it more prudent to 
experiment with different approaches in a changing environment, entailing surplus 
resources and encouraging failure as a requisite for successful adaptation? 
Roberts also offers a public management approach model, which illustrates the 
relationship between efficiency and effectiveness, specifically for public sector 
organizations, shown in Figure 2.4. The directive quadrant reflects a well-oiled machine 
with top-down strategic planning and control, referred to earlier as a typical machine 
bureaucracy, i.e., aircraft carrier or DoD. The generative quadrant reveals a steward type 
of organizational system with high efficiency and high effectiveness, generated through 
collaborative and cooperative stakeholders. The adaptive quadrant highlights an 
organization as a champion of innovation demonstrating high effectiveness but low 
efficiency, i.e., early NASA. In the responsive configuration an organization is not 
concerned with efficiency or effectiveness, but with brokering power and responding to 


























Figure 2.4. Public Sector General Management Approaches (Source: Roberts, 2001) 
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION SYSTEM 
This chapter conducts an analysis of the Defense Acquisition System and 
contrasts it to the key variables of the Roberts organizational systems model discussed in 
Chapter II. Specifically, this chapter focuses on the Defense Acquisition System’s 
environmental context, key success factors, system direction, design factors, culture, 
outputs, and outcomes. While using the components of the Roberts organizational 
systems model does not illuminate every detail of the Defense Acquisition System, it does 
generally reveal the character of the system for the purpose of a system analysis.   
A. ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT 
The Defense Acquisition System is subject to external influences from its 
environment. These forces originate as mutual exclusions external to the system but 
ultimately interact and affect the system’s performance, as the system adapts and adjusts 
accordingly. The significant environmental stimuli that constantly permeate the Defense 
Acquisition System are political forces, budget constraints, commercial and economic 
influences, changing threats, technological advances, and media (societal) pressures.  
1. Political Forces 
Political forces routinely interact with the Defense Acquisition System, mainly 
through formal and informal Congressional oversight, changes in Presidential 
administration, and Congressional schedules. Formal Congressional oversight refers to 
the traditional oversight witnessed with committees such as the House Armed Services 
Committee, Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), and various other committees 
and subcommittees in Congress. The SASC, for example, is charged with oversight of the 
Department’s aeronautical and space activities relating to acquisition of weapon systems, 
military operations, and military research and development.46  
                                                 
46 United States Senate, “Committee Jurisdiction,” U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 
http://armed-services.senate.gov/about.htm (accessed on November 10, 2007). 
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Formal Congressional committees, which are indeed political institutions, provide 
hearings for key Defense Acquisition System leaders to defend program budgets and 
provide status updates, particularly with high dollar MDAP and MAIS programs. Hence, 
some argue the acquisition system’s programs succumb to the whims of legislators whose 
focus is on reelection; thus, oversight activities resemble intentions of political profit 
instead of the best interests of National Defense.47 Regardless of the motives of 
Congress, pure or otherwise, formal oversight is a component of the environment the 
Defense Acquisition System continually interacts with. As a recent example, the House 
Armed Services Air and Land Forces Subcommittee cut $867 million from the Army’s 
premier FCS program budget.48 This decrease in funding happened despite the Defense 
Acquisition System’s built-in mechanisms for prioritization, milestone decisions, and 
program approval.   
Another form of a political environmental context that has an impact on the 
Defense Acquisition System is informal Congressional oversight, which occurs through 
networking and circumvention of committees through well-established ties between 
politicians and members of the DoD.49 For example, the Army FCS, a high profile, 
complex, and risky Defense program, is slated to cost nearly $160 billion through 2022 
for research, development, and procurement.50 This multibillion-dollar program’s 
tentacles stretch across 240 Congressional districts in the continental United States, 
which share geographical (and political) purview over the Army and commercial 
marketplace, including Boeing Corporation, the FCS Lead System Integrator.51 
Consequently, this particular acquisition program engenders lawmaker interest, making 
                                                 
47 James M. Lindsay, “Congressional Oversight of the Department of Defense: Reconsidering the 
Conventional Wisdom,” Armed Forces and Society Vol. 17 No. 1 (Fall 1990): 7-33. 
48 Megan Scully, “House Panel Cuts $867 Million from Future Combat Program,” Government 
Executive.com, May 2, 2007, http://www.govexec.com/story_page.cfm?articleid=36791&sid=21 (accessed 
on November 24, 2007). 
49 James M. Lindsay, “Congressional Oversight of the Department of Defense: Reconsidering the 
Conventional Wisdom,” Armed Forces and Society Vol. 17 No. 1 (Fall 1990): 7-33. 
50 Andrew Feickert, “The Army’s Future Combat Systems (FCS): Background and Issues for 
Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, April 28, 2005.  
51 United States Army, “Future Combat Systems,” http://www.army.mil/fcs (accessed on November 
24, 2007). 
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FCS a hot bargaining chip, vulnerable to Congressional capriciousness from its informal 
alliances.52 The Army FCS serves as only one of many programs within the Defense 
Acquisition System that is susceptible to informal Congressional oversight. Another 
noteworthy example of informal Congressional oversight and influence occurred in 2003 
when Arizona Senator, John McCain, spearheaded the cancellation of the Air Force’s 
controversial airborne refueling tanker lease and acquisition of Boeing 767s to replace 
aging KC-135 Stratotankers. 
A change in Presidential administration is yet another political influence on the 
Defense Acquisition System. Such a transformation often results in a whole new regime 
of civilian leadership with referential power over military and civilian personnel working 
within the acquisition system.53 For example, President George W. Bush appointed Paul 
Wolfowitz as Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSEC) in 2001. Not long after taking 
office, Wolfowitz emphatically declared the Defense Acquisition System broken and 
cancelled preexisting DoD 5000 series directives, instructions, and regulations related to 
acquisition policy and guidance.  
Essentially, on October 30, 2002, the new DEPSEC created significant turmoil 
within the acquisition system by requiring the USD (AT&L), Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (ASD (C3I)), and the 
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) to rewrite the entire set of 
acquisition guidance documents, the DoD 5000 series, within 120 days.54 The Wolfowitz 
initiative expected acquisition leaders to “create an acquisition policy environment that 
fosters efficiency, flexibility, creativity, and innovation.”55 Such a circumstance 
illustrates how the Defense Acquisition System is at the mercy of not just its own military 
leaders but civilian appointees as well.  
                                                 
52 Joseph Yakovac, “MN4307 Program Management Policy and Control,” (Lecture at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, 1st Quarter, 2008). 
53 Cary Simon, “GB3010 Managing for Organizational Effectiveness,” (Lecture at the Naval 
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54 Paul Wolfowitz, “Defense Acquisition,” (Department of Defense memorandum for Secretaries of 
the Military Departments, October 30, 2002). 
55 Ibid. 
 28
Congressional schedules and budget cycles also serve as a potent environmental 
context for the Defense Acquisition System. The system balances Congressional 
schedules and budget cycles in order to periodically plan, budget, gain approval, and 
provide status of major acquisition programs. However, it is especially challenging when 
scheduling and working around proceedings during the first and fourth quarters of the 
DoD’s fiscal year.56 The first quarter occurs over the holiday season from October to 
December. The fourth quarter, which falls between July and September, presents 
scheduling challenges as well, especially since Congress is on summer break for 
approximately a month of that time. This year, the 110th Congress was on recess from 
August 6, 2007 to September 3, 2007. Consequently, the Defense Acquisition System 
works within its political environment, as it balances a myriad of acquisition programs 
with the competing agendas, schedules, and budget cycles of Congress. When major 
programs attempt to align with Congressional schedules and budgeting cycles, the system 
sometimes has to wait.57  
2. Budget Constraints 
Congress controls the checkbook, as the colloquialism goes. Hence, the reality of 
budget constraints, which is a significant force behind political influence, is an 
environmental context with which the Defense Acquisition System must interact. 
Particularly, budget constraints influence the system because of finite resources and 
budgetary law. The Defense Acquisition System and its comprising organizations 
manage finite resources among competing acquisition and political interests, and 
therefore must stretch funds across all of its DoD programs. For example, the Department 
of the Navy funds the Marines’ acquisition of the V-22 Osprey while modernizing Navy 
sea power capabilities. The Air Force spreads funding across the F/A-22 Raptor, JSF, and  
 
 
                                                 
56 Joseph Yakovac, “MN4307 Program Management Policy and Control,” (Lecture at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, 1st Quarter, 2008). 
57 Joseph Yakovac, “MN4307 Program Management Policy and Control,” (Lecture at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, 1st Quarter, 2008). 
 29
Air Operations Center (AOC) upgrades. Further examples of the limitations of finite 
resources abound within the Defense Acquisition System because it is a recurring and 
significant influence on the system.  
The constraint of budgetary law is an additional environmental context. 
Specifically, for the Defense Acquisition System, this budgetary control involves the type 
of Congressional Appropriation or “color of money” further limiting flexibility, in 
accordance with Public Law 101-510, for the various program phases within the system. 
The system's R&D, Procurement, and O&M funds all have life spans of two years, three 
years, and one year respectively. Hence, the system cannot use O&M funds for R&D 
activities and vice versa. The system fundamentally manages and works within these 
budgetary laws, rules, and guidelines where each budget category is intermixed 
throughout system phases. Additionally, the system is required to work within the 
confines of budgetary appropriation, apportionment, commitment, obligation, 
expenditure, and expiration laws and guidance.58 Figure 3.1 below reveals how R&D, 
Procurement, and O&M funds are accessible for obligation and expenditure before the 
funding is canceled and cannot be used for any purpose.59 
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Figure 3.1. Acquisition Funding Categories (Source: Freidrich, 2003) 
 
3. Commercial and Economic Influences 
Commercial and economic influences are also factors of the Defense Acquisition 
System’s environment, specifically with commercial industry motivated by profit and 
economic downturns and upturns. The system operates within a free society and therefore 
is open to the market forces of American enterprise. By law, although there may be 
exceptions in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), the system must negotiate fair 
and reasonable contracts for its procurements via competitive solicitations. Consequently, 
the Defense Acquisition System becomes part and parcel of the commercial marketplace, 
literally “dealing” and “negotiating” with the likes of Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop 
Grumman, General Dynamics, and a multitude of other Defense contractors.   
Economic influences also affect the system. Fluctuations with interest rates, 
domestic and overseas stock markets, unemployment, precious metals and materials, 
chemicals, labor and overhead rates, oil prices, and foreign exchange rates are some of 
the countless economic variables that impact the Defense Acquisition System. To take a 
minor example, the JSF program breached a Nunn-McCurdy (public law) cost growth 
limitation in 2005, where the price per aircraft exceeded 30 percent of its baseline cost 
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estimate in 2001.60 A very small percentage of the cost growth of nearly $68 billion was 
due to labor rate and overhead changes brought on by inflation over the same period.61 
Although inflation of labor rates and overhead were small impressions proportional to the 
operational reasons for JSF cost growth, this instance illustrates the Defense Acquisition 
System's susceptibility to economic influences—even at seemingly insignificant levels.  
4. Changing Threats 
The Defense Acquisition System operates within an evolving and changing threat 
environment. A persistently changing enemy threat landscape affects National Defense 
strategy and combatant commander tactics, which shape requirements for capabilities 
needed within the battle space. As an example, after the terrorist attacks on September 
11, 2001 and subsequent onset of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), it appears the 
nature of American warfighting dramatically shifted from a single-minded, force-on-
force (Cold War) approach to a philosophy with more emphasis on lighter, more 
deployable, and more nimble warfighting wherewithal. The National Defense Security 
Strategy clearly states, “The struggle against global terrorism is different from any other 
war in our history…fought on many fronts against a particularly elusive enemy over a 
long period of time.”62 Consequently, the resulting tactics to locate and kill GWOT 
adversaries demand the Defense Acquisition System provide cutting edge technologies to 
meet the changing and adaptive threat posed by terrorism.  
The aforementioned example illustrates how the Defense Acquisition System is a 
perpetual recipient of changing requirements resulting from changing threats, which flow 
into the system through the JCIDS process. There are numerous procurements in the 
acquisition system’s pipeline that are presently designed to mirror the new threat 
environment. Acquisition initiatives such as enhancement of unmanned aerial vehicles, 
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integration of net centric command and control, and refined intelligence gathering 
capabilities exemplify how the current threat environment shapes the acquisition system.  
5. Technological Advances 
Advancements in technology are a part of the Defense Acquisition System’s 
environmental context as well. A common measure for this fairly recent phenomenon is 
demonstrated with Moore’s Law, which is a theory used to explain the exponential leaps 
in technology, particularly evident since the late 1980s. Moore’s Law states the number 
of transistors that are possible to install on an integrated circuit doubles every eighteen 
months to two years.63 When Moore, a co-founder of Intel Corporation, stumbled upon 
this law in 1966, a chip could accommodate 22,000 transistors, which is dramatically 
fewer than the hundreds of millions envisioned for the future.64 The pace and magnitude 
of technological advancements combined with the relatively long acquisition cycle is a 
significant challenge for the system, and ultimately the DoD. 
Technological advancement forces the Defense Acquisition System to confront an 
appreciable doubling of computing power and capacity with regard to memory and 
storage. Current commercial computers, for example, commonly have gigabytes of 
storage capacity where twenty or forty megabytes used to be considered top-of-the-line 
fifteen years ago. This observable fact does not create complexity issues so much with 
hardware development but with software development of complex military systems, as 
acquisition programs are compelled to take advantage of computing capacity with more 
multifaceted and integrated software products.  
An example of how technological advancement plays into the acquisition 
system’s environmental context is with the Air Force’s F/A-22 Raptor procurement. The 
Raptor program experienced many delays between the mid 1980s and early 2000s, 
mostly due to its unprecedented complexity, but partly as a result of technological leaps 
occurring during the life of the program’s design and development. The Raptor’s 
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progression coincidentally ran parallel with Moore’s era of technological explosion, 
which required the acquisition system to routinely upgrade the F/A-22 Raptor’s 
integrated avionics suite as new technologies emerged.65 
6. Media (Societal) Pressures 
The Defense Acquisition System, primarily resulting from high cost or 
controversial weapons programs, receives significant and critical attention from the 
media, which is a form of societal pressure on the system. This environmental context, as 
an example, is evidenced by the Navy’s well-publicized cost overruns and schedule 
delays with its initial procurement of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) fleet, which is 
designated for modern coastal warfare. The Navy’s original baseline for the LCS 
program called for Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics to each build two ships: 
ships number one and three built by Lockheed Martin, and ships number two and four 
built by General Dynamics. At the onset of the program, the Navy was elated to be in the 
midst of acquiring “a small, fast, affordable ship” that is supposed to “transform naval 
operations in the littorals,” and the Defense contractors had high hopes of delivering on 
their promises.66 
In November of 2007, however, the Department of the Navy broke off contract 
negotiations with General Dynamics and swiftly cancelled planned construction of LCS-
4. This decision piggybacked on an earlier pronouncement in April of 2007 to break off 
negotiations with Lockheed Martin and cancel LCS-3. One of the drivers of these 
cancellations, aside from endemic risk and budgetary constraints, was the well-advertised 
cost growth on LCS-1 and LCS-2. Headlines in the Washington Post such as “Costs 
Ballooning for New Combat Ship” found their way in mainstream newspapers, websites, 
television, radio, and other forms of media.67 Consequently, the media’s scrutiny 
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revealed lackluster cost control on the part of the contractors and poor program 
management on the Navy’s side. Some claim the media pressure inflicted on the system 
undoubtedly had an impact on the Navy’s decision to cancel LCS-3 and LCS-4, 
especially when coupled with the political influence discussed earlier.  
B. KEY SUCCESS FACTORS 
Key success factors are the general things the organizational system needs to do in 
order to be successful. Roberts suggests many key success factors are likely for large, 
public organizations like the Defense Acquisition System.68 In this system’s case, there is 
no specific manual or document that explicitly calls out key success factors. However, 
there are 34 policies identified in DoD Directive 5000.1 The Defense Acquisition System, 
which, given Roberts' explanation, may qualify as key success factors. According to the 
5000 directive, five govern the system, and 29 apply to the system—and all are designed 
to be gateways to system success. 
DoD Directive 5000.1 specifically states the following policies govern the 
Defense Acquisition System: Flexibility, Responsiveness, Innovation, Discipline, and 
Streamlined and Effective Management.69 Because these five governing policies (key 
success factors) are critical to this analysis, their descriptions, which are extracted from 
DoD Directive 5000.1, Section 4.3, are provided below:70 
1. Flexibility 
There is no one best way to structure an acquisition program to accomplish the 
objective of the Defense Acquisition System. Milestone Decision Authorities (MDA) and 
Program Managers (PM) shall tailor program strategies and oversight, including 
documentation of program information, acquisition phases, timing and scope of decision 
reviews, and decision levels, to fit the particular conditions of that program, consistent 
with applicable laws and regulations and the time-sensitivity of the capability need. 
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Advanced technology shall be integrated into producible systems and deployed in 
the shortest time practicable. Approved, time-phased capability needs matched with 
available technology and resources enable evolutionary acquisition strategies. 
Evolutionary acquisition strategies are the preferred approach to satisfying operational 
needs. Spiral development is the preferred process for executing such strategies. 
3. Innovation 
Throughout the DoD, acquisition professionals shall continuously develop and 
implement initiatives to streamline and improve the Defense Acquisition System. MDAs 
and PMs shall examine and, as appropriate, adopt innovative practices (including best 
commercial practices and electronic business solutions) that reduce cycle time and cost, 
and encourage teamwork. 
4. Discipline 
PMs shall manage programs consistent with statute and the regulatory 
requirements specified in DoD Directive 5000.1 The Defense Acquisition System and 
DoD Instruction 5000.2 Operation of the Defense Acquisition System.  Every PM shall 
establish program goals for the minimum number of cost, schedule, and performance 
parameters that describe the program over its life cycle. Approved program baseline 
parameters shall serve as control objectives. PMs shall identify deviations from approved 
acquisition program baseline parameters and exit criteria. 
5. Streamlined and Effective Management 
Responsibility for the acquisition of systems shall be decentralized to the 
maximum extent practicable. The MDA shall provide a single individual with sufficient 
authority to accomplish MDA-approved program objectives for development, production, 
and sustainment. The MDA shall ensure accountability and maximize credibility in cost, 
schedule, and performance reporting. 
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6. Additional Key Success Factors 
DoD Directive 5000.1 highlights 29 additional policies that might also be 
categorized as key success factors to the Defense Acquisition System. Simply noted here, 
Enclosure 1.0 of the 5000 directive identifies the following policies: 
• Armaments Cooperation  
• Collaboration 
• Competition 
• Cost and Affordability 
• Cost Realism 
• Cost Sharing 
• Financial Management 
• Independent Operational Test Agency 
• Information Assurance 
• Information Superiority 
• Integrated Test and Evaluation 
• Intelligence Support 
• Interoperability 
• Knowledge-based Acquisition 
• Legal Compliance 
• Performance-Based Acquisition 
• Performance-based Logistics 
• Products Services and Technologies 
• Professional Workforce 
• Program Information 
• Program Stability 
• Research and Technology Protection 
• Safety 
• Small Business Participation 
• Software Intensive Systems 
• Streamlined Organizations 
• Systems Engineering 
• Technology Development and Transition 
• Total Systems Approach 
C. SYSTEM DIRECTION 
The system direction component of the Roberts organizational systems model acts 
as the input compass for the overall system and highlights the mandate, mission, values, 
and vision of the system. It also emphasizes the strategies that allow the system to 
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accomplish its goals. The Defense Acquisition System’s system direction is largely 
communicated through 5000 series directives and instructions with a release date of May 
12, 2003. This study acknowledges there have been numerous tweaks and changes in 
system direction since the inception of DoD Directive 5000.1 in July 1971.71 Below is the 
current account of system direction.  
1. Mandate, Mission, and Vision 
The following subsection from DoD Directive 5000.1 expresses the Defense 
Acquisition System’s mandate, mission, and vision:   
The Defense Acquisition System exists to manage the nation's investments 
in technologies, programs, and product support necessary to achieve the 
National Security Strategy and support the United States Armed Forces. 
The primary objective of Defense acquisition is to acquire quality products 
that satisfy user needs with measurable improvements to mission 
capability and operational support, in a timely manner, and at a fair and 
reasonable price. The investment strategy of the Department of Defense 
shall be postured to support not only today's force, but also the next force, 
and future forces beyond that.72 
In short, the Defense Acquisition System’s reason to exist is to manage the 
Nation’s investments and develop its resources in support of the National Security 
Strategy. The system also exercises the mission of acquiring timely, cost-efficient, quality 
products in support of the Department’s warfighters. Lastly, this study recognizes there is 
no overt delineation of core values in the present 5000 series policy and documentation 
(possibly mixed in with key success factors mentioned previously), meaning it must draw 
from the espoused values of DoD organizations like the Air Force, e.g., Integrity First, 
Service Before Self, and Excellence in all We Do.   
2. Goals 
Neither of the 5000 series documents explicitly recognizes goals for the overall 
system. Rather, the goals of the Defense Acquisition System stem from the individual 
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acquisition programs that flow through the system. The Defense Acquisition Guidebook, 
which is a guide designed to complement 5000 series acquisition documents, categorizes 
the primary goals for all acquisition programs that pass through the system. Section 2.1 of 
the Defense Acquisition Guidebook states: “Program goals are the minimum number of 
cost, schedule, and performance parameters necessary to describe program objectives.”73  
Essentially, the goals of the Defense Acquisition System take the form of cost, 
schedule, and performance objectives for each program. The Acquisition Program 
Baseline (APB) documents program goals, which are derived from warfighter schedule 
and performance requirements as well as estimated cost projections for the life cycle of 
the program.74 Fundamentally, schedule and performance requirements (which, in the 
Defense Acquisition System's case, are synonymous with goals) originate outside of the 
system from the Joint Capabilities and Integration and Development System (JCIDS). 
These requirements enter the system in the form of inputs. Cost projection goals are 
typically products of inner system development and processing and are designed to focus 
on Total Ownership Cost (TOC), but are often sub optimized on procurement costs.  
It is also important to note that the goals established for a given acquisition 
program are not static. Goals change as a program flows through the system, which could 
be positive or negative. This occurs despite the establishment of an APB and is 
sometimes referred to as requirements creep.75 In a general sense, requirements creep 
traditionally happens when an acquisition program evolves through the acquisition 
system and discovers it needs to change or depart from the original cost, schedule, or 
performance requirements. Requirements creep may be beneficial, for example, through 
the incorporation of updated technology,76 or detrimental as unforeseen system 
requirements are added with cost and schedule typically suffering as a result.  
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Requirements creep (change in goals) is generally introduced to the Defense 
Acquisition System in one of three ways; overlooked requirements, changing 
requirements, and excessive requirements.77 Overlooked requirements are requirements 
warfighters do not foresee or properly identify at the onset of an acquisition program. For 
example, a missile test for the Critical Measurements and Countermeasures (CMCM) 
program experienced a launch delay in April 2006 at Kauai, Hawaii. The holdup was 
caused by an overlooked requirement, which, for safety reasons, belatedly mandated 
adherence to a more stringent trajectory.78 Changing requirements is exactly as it sounds, 
requirements get modified slightly in reaction to justifiable stimuli, like reacting to the 
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) threat in Iraq. Conversely, an excessive requirement 
occurs when warfighters over-specify or provide too many requirements that are rarely 
needed or provided through some other means. This sometimes happens as a result of not 
knowing exactly what is needed.  
3. Evolutionary Acquisition Strategy 
 The Defense Acquisition System’s overarching strategy to accomplish its mission, 
seek its vision, and satisfy its individual program goals is prescribed by Department 
leadership: Evolutionary Acquisition is the preferred approach.79 Evolutionary 
Acquisition is a specific strategy designed to embrace the reality of Moore’s Law while 
leveraging the most mature technologies to warfighters as fast as possible. Although 
evolutionary concepts had been around for decades, the DoD mandated an Evolutionary 
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ran counter to outdated, single-step-to-full-capability strategies, as experienced with the 
F/A-22 Raptor, where all the technological challenges had to be resolved prior to 
production and deployment.80    
Evolutionary Acquisition strategy is based on two conditions that must exist prior 
to deployment and testing of a specified system: 1) Warfighters can utilize the system in 
a real world environment, and 2) The fielded aspect of the system is technologically 
viable.81 In other words, Evolutionary Acquisition seeks to provide quick product 
deployments or incremental spinouts of capability to users as the technology matures. 
This permits programs to evolve and build on each increment deployed to the field until 
the original warfighter requirements are met.  
Hence, it is accepted practice to field an item if some of the critical performance 
parameters are not satisfied with the first increment because Evolutionary Acquisition 
absorbs risk of underperformance through constant feedback and testing from warfighters 
performing in the battle space.82 An example of Evolutionary Acquisition is demonstrated 
with the Navy’s incremental procurement of the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet models where 
early deployed systems provided essential capability for the warfighter with later 
developments and deployment adding additional capability needed by the warfighter for 
other specialized missions—as technologies matured. 
There are two methodologies that enable Evolutionary Acquisition strategy within 
the Defense Acquisition System: spiral and incremental. Spiral is the preferred 
methodology, according to DoD Directive 5000.1, and it means the desired capability is 
known by the warfighter, but the specific requirements and end state are unclear at the 
program’s onset. Alternatively, incremental methodology defines the desired capability, 
requirements, and the end state from the outset. In the most basic sense, spiral 
methodology is an unscripted venture and incremental methodology is a scripted 
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undertaking. The common theme with both of these evolutionary methodologies, 
however, is the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) of the fully desired capability is not 
mature or is unaffordable at the program’s initiation, hence the need for incremental 
deployments and evolution. 
D. DESIGN FACTORS 
Design factors make up key components of the Roberts organizational systems 
model, as they are also elements for which the system can mold and shape to optimize 
performance of the system as it interacts with inputs and the environment. The 
subsections below generally portray the design factors of the Defense Acquisition System 
with respect to its Tasks, Technology, Structure, People, and Processes/Subsystems.  
1. Tasks 
Tasks are the basic functions of an organizational system, and there are 
innumerable tasks that make up the Defense Acquisition System. Activities such as 
program management, systems engineering, contracting, financial management, cost 
estimation, test and evaluation, logistics and supportability management, modeling and 
simulation, documentation, software development, configuration management, strategy 
development, risk management, Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP), and formal reviews 
represent a small sampling of the myriad of tasks attributable to the system.  
Consequently, it is only possible to generalize the primary tasks of the Defense 
Acquisition System, where all of the possible subtasks within the system roll up and 
support what DoD Instruction 5000.2 Operation of the Defense Acquisition System 
classifies as major phases of the overall system. These system phases—which this study 
treats as major tasks—are Concept Refinement, Technology Development, System 
Development and Demonstration (SDD), Production and Deployment, and Operations 
and Support. Figure 3.2 illustrates the major phases (tasks) of the Defense Acquisition 
System. Each phase’s (task’s) general description is taken via DoD Instruction 5000.2:83 
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Figure 3.2. Defense Acquisition System Phases (Source: DoD Instruction 5000.2) 
a. Concept Refinement 
The purpose of this phase is to refine the initial concept and develop a 
Technology Development Strategy. Entrance into this phase depends upon an approved 
Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) resulting from the analysis of potential concepts 
across the DoD Components, international systems from Allies, and cooperative 
opportunities; and an approved plan for conducting an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) for 
the selected concept, documented in the approved ICD. 
b. Technology Development 
The purpose of this phase is to reduce technology risk and to determine 
the appropriate set of technologies to be integrated into a full system. Technology 
Development is a continuous technology discovery and development process reflecting 
close collaboration between the Science and Technology community, the user, and the 
system developer. It is an iterative process designed to assess the viability of technologies 
while simultaneously refining user requirements. 
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c. System Development and Demonstration 
The purpose of the System Development and Demonstration Phase (SDD) 
phase is to develop a system or an increment of capability; reduce integration and 
manufacturing risk; ensure operational supportability with particular attention to 
reducing the logistics footprint; implement human systems integration; design for 
producibility; ensure affordability and the protection of critical program information by 
implementing appropriate techniques such as anti-tamper; and demonstrate system 
integration, interoperability, safety, and utility…The two key functions of SDD are 
System Integration and System Demonstration. 
d. Production and Deployment 
The purpose of the Production and Deployment phase is to achieve an 
operational capability that satisfies mission needs. Operational test and evaluation shall 
determine the effectiveness and suitability of the system. The MDA shall make the 
decision to commit the DoD to production at Milestone C. Milestone C authorizes entry 
into LRIP (for Major Defense Acquisition Programs and major systems), or into 
production or procurement (for non-major systems that do not require LRIP), or into 
limited deployment in support of operational testing for Major Automated Information 
System programs or software-intensive systems with no production components. 
e. Operations and Maintenance 
The objective of this activity is the execution of a support program that 
meets operational support performance requirements and sustains the system in the most 
cost-effective manner over its total life cycle. When the system has reached the end of its 
useful life, it shall be disposed of in an appropriate manner. Operations and Support has 
two major efforts: Sustainment and Disposal. 
2. Technology (Flow) 
Workflows and interdependencies between tasks clarify what is meant by 
technology with regard to Robert’s organizational systems model. While depicting a flow 
diagram with any granularity is just as unfeasible as delineating all of the acquisition 
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system’s tasks and subtasks, Figure 3.2, at a minimum, represents a spectrum of 
sequential, overarching process flow within the system. Each major phase (major task) in 
the system is designed to build on the previous phase in support of a life cycle 
philosophy. Furthermore, the linkages between the phases by way of milestone decisions 
necessitate intermediate inputs and outputs within the system. DoD Instruction 5000.2 
outlines the general boundaries of technology (flow) that make up the system.  
Essentially, the Defense Acquisition System starts its flow of tasks with the 
process of defining and exploring User Needs and Technological Opportunities. 
Therefore, the system ensures concepts are developed in accordance with user 
requirements in the Concept Refinement Phase, which are further solidified at the 
Milestone A decision before advancing into the Technology Development phase. The 
completion of Technology Development is ratified with a Milestone B decision, which 
officially signifies the initiation of a program prior to entrance into the SDD Phase. After 
development and demonstration of the procurement item through a significant amount of 
testing and integration, Milestone C is the next major juncture. After the Milestone C 
decision, the procurement item, if applicable, is then ready to progress into LRIP before 
heading into the full-up Production and Deployment Phase of the acquisition process. 
Once the procurement item has been fielded, the last phase of Operations and Support 
kicks into high gear, which denotes Initial Operational Capability (IOC) and Full 
Operational Capability (FOC). 
One might mostly characterize the technology, or major flow of tasks within the 
Defense Acquisition System, as chronologically dependent, given the sequential nature of 
the aforementioned. Essentially, the quality of subsequent tasks is typically reliant on the 
quality of predecessor tasks. This means, for example, a Technology Development 
Strategy (TDS) must be established prior to SDD. The Test and Evaluation Master Plan 
(TEMP) should be written before integration and developmental and operational testing. 
The Critical Design Review (CDR) shall happen before product manufacture begins. In 
other words, a calculated flow (technology) within the overall system exists as a weapon 
system becomes defined, refined, designed, produced, fielded, maintained, and 
disposed—which is illustrative of an acquisition life cycle.  
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While the overarching technology of the Defense Acquisition System is serial and 
geared toward a life cycle, a derivative explanation of the system’s technology is 
warranted. Tasks and subtasks within the system may flow in parallel or feed backward. 
A good example of parallel technology is when a program manager plans for life cycle 
logistics support and integration while working the early stages of design and 
development. An example of when the system’s technology feeds backward is when 
verification and validation of requirements or specifications occurs during a weapon 
system’s testing and evaluation activities. It is also important to recognize that technology 
varies with each acquisition program; hence, the workflows will not only differ but 
overlap within the system. Furthermore, although DoD Instruction 5000.2 provides a 
useful template for how to construct a program’s technology (interrelationships of tasks 
and flow), compositions of flows are customarily unique, complex, and circuitous. 
3. Structure (Organization) 
Structure, with respect to the Roberts organizational systems model, is a design 
factor that accounts for the system groupings of activities and people. In other words, it 
addresses how the system organizes tasks and personnel. Recall the Defense Acquisition 
System resides within the Defense Acquisition Framework as one of three interconnected 
Decision Support Systems, the other two being JCIDS and PPBE (shown in Figure 1.1).  
The Defense Acquisition System’s tasks are functionally integrated, meaning they 
are not isolated from various JCIDS and PPBE activities. Figure 3.3 offers a pictorial 
representation of the interconnectivity of the Defense Acquisition System within the 
Defense Acquisition Framework. Tasks generally flow from left to right and are grouped 
into phases, which were described previously. The phases are depicted with vertical lines 
as they interconnect with each Decision Support System within the framework. Hence, 
within each phase, the Defense Acquisition System’s realm of responsibilities and its 
tasks blend with JCIDS and PPBE as programs progress through the system’s life cycle. 
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Figure 3.3. Defense Acquisition System within the Defense Acquisition Framework 
(Source: DoD Instruction 5000.2) 
 
The organizational arrangements that contribute to the management of the 
Defense Acquisition System are similarly complex to its partitions and groupings of 
tasks. The system has far reaching organizational tentacles, as it applies to all acquisition 
programs within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Departments, Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commands, Office of the Inspector General of the 
Department of Defense, Defense Agencies, DoD Field Activities, and all other DoD 
organizational entities.84 For all intents and purposes, anything and everything 
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acquisition-related converges on the Defense Acquisition System in some form, meaning 
that thousands of military, DoD civilian, contractor organizations, and sub organizations 
participate in the Defense Acquisition System.  
It is not feasible to portray an inclusive organizational chart because there is no 
prescriptive, formal organizational structure for the Defense Acquisition System. Recall 
the system is a process for which organizations control, participate, and manage 
individual programs. Hence, organizational structures vary with each program. This 
current framework is evidenced by the nature of the leadership position with oversight 
over the Defense Acquisition System. This position lies with USD (AT&L); however, 
this role does not grant command or authoritative power over the organizations that 
contribute to the system. Rather, the USD (AT&L), as a principal staff agent to the 
Secretary of Defense (Figure 3.4), provides policy, guidance, and instruction for the 
management of the Defense Acquisition System. As a result, DoD Directive 5134.1 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics simply promotes 
the establishment of acquisition lanes that remove duplication of effort and drive 
Department components to work together seamlessly.85  
 
Figure 3.4. USD (AT&L) within OSD (Source: DoD, March 2001) 
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Once more, there is no universally accepted construct for formulating 
organizations that operate within the Defense Acquisition System. This means 
organizations, which may be geographically separated, must develop the best ways to 
interact together within the system, which is frequently accomplished by way of 
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). An MOA is an example of a document used to 
establish relationships between two or more organizations working collaboratively within 
the Defense Acquisition System. It customarily highlights agreements between 
organizations in five areas: 1) Identifies ground rules for information exchange and 
coordination of activities, 2) Establishes level of participation, 3) Provides points of 
contact or liaisons, 4) Explains roles and responsibilities, and 5) Creates horizontal, 
matrix organizational relationships, if necessary.86 An example of an MOA is seen with 
the Missile Defense Agency's partnership with the Air Force’s Space and Missile 
Systems Center and the Army’s Space and Missile Defense Command in order to acquire 
and test missile systems. An MOA is sometimes referred to as a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU), but both are collateral agreements, not legally binding.   
Although there is no mandated design for organizations taking part in the Defense 
Acquisition System, there are three organizational entities, in addition to USD (AT&L), 
which are principal focal points for the system: 1) ASD (C3I), 2) DOT&E, and 3) CJCS. 
DoD Directive 5000.1 states the offices of USD (AT&L), ASD (C3I), and DOT&E “are 
key officials of the Defense Acquisition System…they may jointly issue DoD 
Instructions, DoD Publications, and one-time directive-type memoranda, consistent with 
DoD 5025.1-M.”87 The directive also states, “The CJCS shall provide advice and 
assessment on military capability needs…and may engage components and agencies to 
provide this advice and assessment.”88  
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In effect, the offices of USD (AT&L), ASD (C3I) and DOT&E govern the 
Defense Acquisition System without real dominion over the organizations operating 
within the system. Conversely, the CJCS largely holds positional power over most DoD 
organizations, yet the Defense Acquisition System is not a subordinate organization or 
process under the Chairman’s direct control. Rather, the CJCS provides inputs to the 
system by way of expressing capability needs through the JCIDS Decision Support 
System. This arrangement of informal alliances at the highest levels of organization 
within the DoD sets the tone for how organizations manage and cooperate within the 
Defense Acquisition System at the lower levels.  
In order to organize major Defense Acquisition System program management 
within the framework of DoD organizational hierarchies, program offices are customarily 
established with horizontal, matrix-type Integrated Product Teams (IPT). Program offices 
of single or joint origin serve as focal points for major defense programs like JSF, for 
example. The JSF Program Office is lead by a Program Executive Officer (PEO), which 
is currently an Air Force Major General, yet could be from any service. The PEO, in this 
case, manages the JSF program through the major tasks or phases of the Defense 
Acquisition System with the help of IPTs, which are apportioned to the JSF Program 
Office. In the most basic sense, an IPT is made up of personnel from diverse parent 
organizations that form a “multidisciplinary group of people who are collectively 
responsible for delivering a defined product or process.”89 There is no limit on the 
number of IPTs supporting a program, and there may be just a few for smaller programs, 
and many are needed for MDAP or MAIS programs. As an illustration, the JSF Program 
Office has sixteen IPTs (Figure 3.5).90 
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90 Department of Defense, “Program,” Joint Strike Fighter, http://www.jsf.mil/program/prog_org.htm 
(accessed on November 14, 2007). 
 50
 
Figure 3.5. Joint Strike Fighter Program IPTs (Source: JSF Program, 2007) 
4. People (Workforce) 
Defense Acquisition System personnel may be military, DoD civilian, or support 
contractor, who also participate as significant contributors to the system, but are not 
considered part of the Government’s acquisition workforce. Nonetheless, the personnel 
that make up the acquisition workforce and labor force within the Defense Acquisition 
System are most aptly described as professional and educated. Nevertheless, this study 
must note the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has been critical of the 
knowledge, skills, and abilities of the acquisition workforce. 
Generally, career-oriented Defense acquisition personnel demonstrate assorted 
degrees of skill, knowledge, and ability proficiency in a variety of business, engineering, 
and technically related fields. Examples include: Program Management; Contracting; 
Systems Engineering; Cost Estimating; Financial Management; Facilities Engineering; 
Information Technology; Life Cycle Logistics; Systems Sustainment and Management; 
Production, Quality, and Manufacturing; Purchasing; Systems Planning, Research, 
Development and Engineering; Accounting; Science & Technology Management; Test 
and Evaluation; and Software Development. Incidentally, as an example, the Army, 
Navy, and Air Force have acquisition workforces (military and DoD civilian) of 45,443, 
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40,651, and 25,075 respectively. Engineering disciplines represent 26 percent, 41 percent, 
and 25 percent of those respective acquisition workforces.91  
There is a distinctive part of the workforce called the Acquisition Corps, which is 
distinguished from other military and DoD civilian counterparts. DoD Directive 5000.52 
Defense Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Workforce Education, Training, and 
Career Development Program recognizes acquisition professionals as being members of 
the Acquisition Corps after passing qualifications set forth in Chapter 87 of Title 10, 
United States Code, Subchapter III. The code levies educational and experience 
requirements to qualify for the Acquisition Corps: baccalaureate degree, at least 24 
semester hours of higher education, at least 24 semester hours of higher education 
pertaining to one’s career field, and promotion potential.92 Acquisition Corps members 
fill Critical Acquisition Positions (CAP) identified by DoD Component Acquisition 
Executives (CAE), which are the most senior acquisition positions within the DoD.93  
Much of the professionalism of the acquisition workforce is due to Defense 
Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA), which was passed in November 
1990. This law mandates standards of professional development and education 
throughout the acquisition community and establishes education, training, and experience 
minimums for acquisition-critical positions.  
5. Processes/Subsystems 
Roberts encourages analysis of three areas under the design factors category of 
processes/subsystems: 1) Human Resource Management, 2) Measurement and Controls, 
and 3) Planning, Communication, and Information Management. The Defense 
Acquisition System has copious processes and subsystems, which, again, are impossible  
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to enumerate here, that assist with managing the overall system. Even so, the following 
identifies some of the major processes and subsystems relevant to this analysis of the 
Defense Acquisition System.  
a. Human Resource Management 
Defense Acquisition University (DAU) is the training hub for Defense 
Acquisition System organizations and personnel. DAU publishes the “horse blanket,” 
which is a two feet by three feet wall chart that illustrates the Decision Support Systems 
and their interrelationships between phases of the Defense Acquisition Framework 
(Figure 3.3).94 The mission of DAU is to “provide practitioner training, career 
management, and services to enable the Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
community to make smart business decisions and deliver timely and affordable 
capabilities to the warfighter.”95  
Basically, DAU gears its education toward the professional development 
of the DoD civilian and military acquisition workforce. DAU received accreditation from 
the Council of Occupational Education in February 2003 and is able to provide 
certifications to the acquisition workforce for various acquisition disciplines. Such 
certifications are important for meeting DAWIA training requirements and promotion 
and job qualifications, i.e., Acquisition Corps, within the Defense Acquisition System. 
b. Controls and Measurements 
Many of the controls and measurements of the Defense Acquisition 
System come in the form of regulations, directives, instructions, and guidance. Some of 
the policy-driven controls have been mentioned; however, the system is also governed by 
the guidance provided in the FAR, which, according to FAR Subpart 1.101 is 
“established for the codification and publication of uniform policies and procedures for 
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acquisition by all executive agencies.”96 The FAR's guidance is further refined through 
the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), which is tailored to 
unique DoD requirements. Moreover, the Armed Services, agencies, and elements of the 
DoD have various acquisition-related supplements with ever more directive control. 
Armed Services examples include Army Regulation (AR) 70-1 Army Acquisition Policy, 
Department of Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 70-3 Army Acquisition Procedures, Secretary 
of the Navy Instruction (SECNAVINST) 5000.2C Implementation and Operation of the 
Defense Acquisition System and the Joint Capabilities and Integration and Development 
System, and Air Force Instruction (AFI) 63-101 Acquisition System.  
Other examples of controls and measures for the system are milestone 
decisions, formal reviews, and program baselines. Milestone decisions are integral 
control points that ensure programs are ready to progress to the next phase, e.g., from 
Technology Development to SDD with a Milestone B decision. Formal reviews like the 
CDR, provide assurance that procurement design is complete and will likely result in 
construction of a suitable system prior to fabrication and integration of subcomponents. 
Also, at a broad level, program baselines such as the APB establish cost, schedule, and 
performance goals that help measure a program’s progress through the system’s life 
cycle. Lastly, Earned Value Management (EVM) is a common subsystem that helps track 
cost and schedule status of system programs.  
c. Planning, Communication, and Information Management 
There is no formal planning, communication, and information 
management mechanism for the Defense Acquisition System. Rather, leaders encourage 
the use of “Best Practices.”97 Each program and its supporting organizations have the 
autonomy to decide how to best plan, communicate, and manage information within the 
confines of the laws, policies, and guidance governing the system. Often times planning, 
communication, and information management methodologies are determined by the PEO 
or PM in concert with the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA), acquisition leadership 
                                                 
96 Federal Acquisition Regulation, Subpart 1.101. 
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and within established norms of the acquisition workforce. There are key planning 
documents such as the Acquisition Strategy, Test and Evaluation Strategy, Systems 
Engineering Plan (SEP), Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP), Risk Management 
Plan, and many others that document and assist with planning, but even the constructs of 
these documents vary from program to program.  
Lastly, there are a multitude of software programs available to help 
manage acquisition system information, aside from traditional Microsoft Office functions 
used throughout the DoD. One example is the Comprehensive Cost and Requirements 
System (CCaRS), which is a program used by some Air Force organizations to manage 
funding documents, budgets, contracting documents, and requirements. CCaRS is one of 
countless non-standardized information management tools used within the Defense 
Acquisition System.  
E. CULTURE 
Culture is one of the manifestations of the Defense Acquisition System that is 
difficult to adequately define, as the system’s culture is part of DoD culture—and the 
possibilities are endless. Roberts urges an evaluation of norms, values, conflict 
management, and patterns of interaction, but it is impractical to provide a line-by-line 
assessment of these areas, mostly because the system encompasses too many variables 
for the scope of this holistic study. However, there are aspects of culture useful for 
analysis, both with negative and positive connotations. 
The GAO defines the culture of the Defense Acquisition System as being “the 
collective behavior of the various participants in the acquisition process and the forces 
that motivate their behavior.”98 The GAO cites cultural norms such as parochialism, undo 
optimism, and stick-to-itiveness as being unconstructive.99 Parochialism refers to 
prisoner’s dilemma manifestations through lack of trust and interest in self-
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preservation.100 In other words, DoD chains of command represent a large, bureaucratic 
landscape, which is ripe for agenda setting.101 Undo optimism refers to the tendency of 
system players to collectively and unreasonably forecast assurances of cost, schedule, and 
performance without a basis in realism. Stick-to-itiveness refers to the propensity to stay 
the course with acquisition programs despite causal evidence to cancel such programs, 
i.e., some say the V-22 Osprey. On the other hand, there are positive cultural aspects of 
the system too. A culture of teaming, collaboration, integrity, loyalty, and dedication of 
well-intentioned professionals permeates the Defense Acquisition System.  
F. OUTPUTS 
The outputs of the Defense Acquisition System result from acquisition programs 
that proceed through the system, which take the form of products or services that are 
delivered in support of America’s defense, referred to in this study as warfighters. 
Outputs of the system can be almost anything supporting warfighter missions. Examples 
include aircraft for the Air Force, tanks for the Army, software-intensive databases for 
the Navy’s personnel system, intelligence gathering satellites, or food and housing 
services for troops serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. The outputs of the system are 
generally measured in accordance with cost, schedule, and performance metrics (goals). 
G. OUTCOMES (INTENDED AND UNINTENDED) 
Recall the Roberts organizational systems model speaks to outcomes as the 
consequences of outputs, which are interpreted relative to the system’s environment 
(Figure 3.6). For simplicity, this research classifies outcomes as two basic types: intended 
or unintended. Intended outcomes are positive results that stem from the system. In the 
case of the Defense Acquisition System, there are numerous positive, intended outcomes 
that are indisputable. For example, the system supplied capability that significantly 
contributed to winning the Cold War with the Soviet Union by providing advanced 
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weapons capability for National Defense. Also, in practical terms, America currently has 
the most advanced military “the history of the world has ever seen,” and much of it is due 
to the mission platforms provided by the Defense Acquisition Systems.102 Indeed, the 
system yields good, intended outcomes. 
 
 
Figure 3.6. Roberts Model Outcomes (Source: Bruner, 1998) 
 
Conversely, bad, unintended outcomes are results for which the system does not 
desire. For example, cost overruns, schedule delays, and poor performance are precisely 
the outcomes the Defense Acquisition System intends to avoid.103 Accordingly, it is 
worthwhile to take a moment and briefly elaborate on these particular unintended 
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outcomes—especially since the acquisition system is routinely stigmatized for its 
repeated shortfalls in metric areas of cost, schedule, and performance.  
1. Cost Overruns 
The Defense Acquisition System has experienced difficulty with accurately 
projecting costs. For example, the Space Based Infrared Radar System (SIBRS), which 
has been in development since 1996 and is intended to provide next generation missile 
early warning and detection capabilities, has experience innumerable cost overruns since 
its inception—in excess of billions of dollars, and, in some cases, over 100 percent of 
predicted cost.104 On average, according to a study done nearly twenty years ago, DoD 
acquirers paid a forty percent premium for weapons procurements, which means the 
Government doled out $400 million extra for a $1 billion program.105 Unfortunately, 
there are signs the trend is getting worse in the current era where Government 
Accountability Office reports suggest cost overrun percentages are averaging as high as 
50 percent—which might even be a conservative figure given the performance of 
programs like SIBRS.106 
Furthermore, evidence shows contractors routinely do not recover from cost 
overruns once they exceed their projections, especially late in a program’s acquisition 
cycle. Once a contractor busts its budget, it is almost impossible to restore the financial 
plan back to its original baseline, especially if the contractor has surpassed the fifteen 
percent completion point of the contract.107 In other words, the further one progresses 
through the Defense Acquisition System, the more difficult it is to recover from cost 
overruns. A noted example of a cost overrun outcome is with the Navy’s LCS 
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procurement. Lockheed Martin was not quite 75 percent complete with the construction 
of LCS-3, but estimates revealed cost overruns as high as $100 million for this vessel, 
which was supposed to cost approximately $220 million.108 According to the trend, from 
a cost perspective, LCS-3 would have never gotten back on track. In fact, it did not 
because the Navy recently cancelled the contract with Lockheed Martin, as stated earlier. 
2. Schedule Delays 
For major Defense programs, Defense Acquisition System cycle times, on 
average, are approximately ten years, and, in the worst cases, procurements have taken 
upwards of 25 years to initially field a new weapon system for America’s warfighters.109 
To revisit an example, one of the DoD’s most frequently touted schedule delay cases is 
the acquisition of the F/A-22 Raptor. The F/A-22 is a state-of-the-art weapon system, 
which was originally conceived in 1981 and has just recently entered service, 26 years 
after conception. The Raptor is currently populating the flight lines of the Air Force, as it 
is still in the Production and Deployment Phase; yet, it is an acquisition that is ebbing 
close to three decades. Albeit, the Air Force is currently fielding one of the most 
advanced fighters in the world, which is an intended outcome; however, some argue the 
timing of F/A-22 delivery is way too late, especially given the nature of an evolving 
manner of warfare under GWOT, an environmental context discussed previously.   
3. Poor Performance 
Poor Performance is another unintended outcome of the Defense Acquisition 
System. The Defense Travel System (DTS), for example, was designed to facilitate the 
travel orders and approval process, thereby automating scheduling of flights, hotels, and 
rental cars—similar in function to Expedia.com. When DTS was first introduced to the 
field, it did not live up to expectations, as the initial fielding of the system caused major 
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problems for users that had to use it.110 There were bugs in the software, travel order 
approval and coordination loops had not been ironed out, and customers did not receive 
travel reimbursement for weeks.   
One more example of poor performance was seen with the deployment of the 
Theater Battle Management Core System (TBMCS) during the onset of Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF) in October 2001.111 TBMCS was a software-based operating 
system designed to help coordinate command and control activities between joint 
planners and operators during OEF wartime activities. One of the many TBMCS 
applications was intended to help keep track of targeting data. However, users quickly 
learned that the targeting application embedded in the Unix-based TBMCS operating 
system was not compatible with a targeting officer’s day-to-day mission needs. 
Consequently, targeteers had to default to using Windows-based Excel spreadsheets to 
keep track of their targets, which was not ideal given that Excel is not a database tool. 
TBMCS, in a real wartime environment, was rendered useless to the targeting 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This final chapter presents conclusions based on theoretical tools and analysis 
respectively presented in Chapters II and III. In particular, conclusions are drawn from 
the holistic relationships between the following: Defense Acquisition System; systems 
theory; organizational approaches and configurations; and the Roberts organizational 
systems model. This chapter also proffers recommendations for system improvement, 
intended for leaders, i.e., USD (AT&L), with influential power over the system.  
A. A FIT OF LOW EFFICIENCY AND MEDIUM EFFECTIVENESS 
Conclusion: The greater Defense Acquisition System appears to resemble a 
construct marked by low efficiency and medium effectiveness, befitting that of a 
firefighter and, at times, a champion of innovation. Revisiting Roberts’ four 
approaches to public sector management helps because the Defense Acquisition System 
fits a mostly responsive and somewhat adaptive profile (Figure 4.1). This 
characterization represents a natural system tendency, which is not meant to pass 
judgment; rather, it merely provides a fit for which subsequent system configurations 
should be consistent and harmonious.112 
 
Figure 4.1. Character of the Defense Acquisition System (Source: Roberts, 2001) 
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 The system is mostly responsive (low efficiency) for a number of reasons. The 
system interacts with an enormously complex machine bureaucracy within an unstable 
environmental context, which contributes to low efficiency. Political influences, budget 
constraints, changing threats, technological advances, commercial and economic 
influences, and societal pressures impact, what under perfect circumstances, might 
become an efficient acquisition system. Particularly, potent political forces and 
increasingly constrained resources force the system's stakeholders to compete and 
respond in a parochial fashion. Stakeholders are also enabled to compete and broker for 
power within the Defense Acquisition System's construct due to the lack of rigidity in 
organizational structures. Also, repeated, unintended system outcomes of cost overruns 
and schedule delays point to low efficiency. Lastly, one of the five policies (key success 
factors) in DoD Directive 5000.1 The Defense Acquisition System is "Responsiveness." 
An objective examination suggests the system is also moderately adaptive 
(medium effectiveness), partly due to the formation of organizational adhocracies, 
embraced flexibility, and indisputable effectiveness of some of the system's products and 
services.113 The use of IPTs or matrix organizations creates ad hoc relationships that 
support acquisition programs. "Flexibility" is also encouraged as a system governing 
policy in DoD 5000.1. Therefore, many attributes of the system lean toward low 
efficiency—but in the adaptive realm as well. This research must also acknowledge the 
big-picture effectiveness of the Defense Acquisition System's products and services that 
support America's warfighters, i.e., aircraft, ships, tanks, and satellites, which further 
pushes the system up into the moderately effective—or adaptive realm.  
Recommendation: The Office of USD (AT&L) should acknowledge that the 
Defense Acquisition System is mostly responsive, sharpen firefighting skills, and 
commence further study on the system's questionable adaptive effects, as they might 
be strikingly detrimental to the system due to a lack of a natural fit. The factors that 
force the system to be responsive are primarily products of its environmental context—
and therefore uncontrollable and necesssary. Unless the Federal Government undergoes a 
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major restructuring that rids a culture of parochialism, continued development of power 
brokerage and crisis management skills are indispensable.114 Also, recall there are trade-
offs between efficiency and effectiveness, where doing more of one may affect the other, 
and vice versa. Evidence shows unwarranted attempts at hybrids of efficiency and 
effectiveness when an organizational system is ill-fitted may cause poorer performance of 
the system in at least one of those areas.115  
Therefore, it is possible that current efficiency levels, which are supposed to be 
low due to its responsive character, are even lower or worse than necessary. 
Consequently, adaptive approaches such as flexibility, collaboration, non-
standardization, and decentralized organizational strategies merit a closer look with 
regard to the true effects on the system. The end result might mean picking a workable 
approach instead of trying to do too much, i.e., sticking with what is best for the system 
to thrive, i.e., more directive management approaches to offset mismatched adaptive 
philosophies. Note this potential mismatch in system fit accordingly affects the rest of the 
conclusions and recommendations. 
 B. KEY SUCCESS FACTORS OR FAILURE FACTORS 
Conclusion: The majority of the 34 policies (key success factors) are likely 
untenable within the current set-up of the Defense Acquisition System. The GAO 
stated in a November 2006 report, "The DoD’s current approach to managing service 
acquisition has tended to be reactive and has not fully addressed the key factors for 
success at either the strategic or transactional level." Parenthetically, it is worth stating 
that being reactive is not necessarily a bad thing (discussed above); rather, it is an 
inevitability and part of the true character of the Defense Acquisition System.   
However, the GAO may be right about key success factors. Acquisition leaders 
may not have adequately understood the true key success factors of the system, leading to 
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the tendency for continual acquisition reforms. From a systems analysis standpoint, some 
of the key success factors seem incongruent and do not fit, relevant to other system 
components, revealed through the Roberts organizational systems model. This research 
presumes 34 key success factors from DoD Directive 5000.1, five primary and 29 
additional. Given the tendency of the system to be lowly efficient and moderately 
effective, and its interrelationships with a constraining environmental context and 
parochial culture, fulfilling all of the 34 key success factors is perhaps unrealistic.  
For example, key success factors like Flexibility, Streamlined and Effective 
Management, Interoperability, Collaboration, and Streamlined Organizations appear to be 
in contravention of a DoD organizational construct indicative of centralized power and its 
resulting normative behaviors—despite the embracement of matrix-type IPTs. For 
example, members on IPTs come together under the guise of being “jointly” 
interconnected through “horizontal matrixing,” but are beholden to parent organizations, 
which, in many cases, are from different Armed Services and have juxtaposed goals.116  
Despite this organizational and cultural reality, many of the system’s existing key 
success factors presuppose DoD personnel and organizations will voluntarily collaborate 
without allegiance to umbilical ties. Moreover, when coupling potentially contrived key 
success factors with ambiguous system direction like “use of best practices” and 
“achievement of best value,” technology (flow) within the system almost certainly suffers 
due to the inconsistency and vagaries of common practices within the system that may 
require more rigidity.117 Hence, the very policies promulgated by USD (AT&L) might be 
more damaging than helpful to the system.   
Recommendation: The Office of USD (AT&L) should revisit all 34 policies 
(key success factors) of the Defense Acquisition System to ensure proper fit with 
environmental context and culture, as well as understand the impact of key success 
factors on system technology (flow). The environmental context is significantly out of 
DoD’s control. Culture, on the other hand, is more changeable, but it is highly 
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implausible for the USD (AT&L) to shape a new culture because of a lack of real, 
authoritative power over the DoD organizations and personnel participating in the 
Defense Acquisition System. Consequently, USD (AT&L) may need to change key 
success factors in accordance with the system’s true context (fit), focusing on what the 
system must do to be successful relative to its constraints.  
The answers likely do not lie with the current 34 key success factors. In a report 
provided to the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness and Management 
Support, the GAO claims attempts at flexibility—a current system key success factor—
have proven painful and have vilified the ill-fitted acquisition system.118 As a minimum, 
trade-off studies between the extremes of flexibility and inflexibility policies or 
efficiency and effectiveness initiatives are worth a finer critical analysis to better 
understand their effects on the system’s technology (flow). Indeed, principles from the 
Roberts organizational systems model underscore the proper fitting of key success factors 
and implementation of commensurate design factors, which may yield a better 
opportunity to attain intended cost, schedule, and performance outcomes for the Defense 
Acquisition System's programs.  
C. FEEDBACK AND A FORMAL MECHANISM FOR LEARNING 
Conclusion:  The Defense Acquisition System appears to demonstrate the 
inability to adequately interpret feedback and/or apply learning. One of the major 
reasons for this assessment is the existence of well-documented examples of repeated, 
unintended outcomes of the system: cost overruns, schedule delays, and poor 
performance. The fundamental premise of feedback is the system's self-assessment of 
how well it is functioning. If feedback is positive, the system knows to maintain its 
course. If feedback is negative, the system must adapt and make adjustments to better 
shape the system’s outcomes.  
The Defense Acquisition System habitually receives negative feedback in the 
form of criticisms from the GAO, media, and even warfighters. Yet, the system continues 
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to implement the same mistakes again and again. If the system were adequately 
interpreting feedback and learning from its shortfalls, one would expect to see a trend 
toward improvement in program metrics of cost, schedule, and performance—or at least 
see different mistakes surface. However, this does not appear to be the case, especially 
with MDAP and MAIS acquisition programs.  
This research analyzes three possible causes of learning shortfalls in the system. 
One potential contributor originates with the lack of fit between the real character of the 
system and USD (AT&L) policies of unstructured collaboration, teaming, and many of 
the other key success factors discussed previously. In other words, best practices and 
flexible methodologies of doing business might be valuable and sustainable, only if the 
system learns and applies lessons. If the system is incapable or formal mechanisms are 
not in place to interpret feedback and apply lessons learned, it will likely continue to 
perform really inefficiently, indefinitely.  
Ironically, another possible culprit that might compound learning issues is the 
individual training provided by DAU, the system’s education hub. DAU offers top-notch 
courses for Defense Acquisition System disciplines such as contracting, program 
management, and logistics; however, DAU may be reinforcing the very qualities, i.e., key 
success factors, counterproductive to the system’s success.  
Finally, another possible reason for the system’s lack of learning is due to the 
absence of a formal, mandated, and structured subsystem to filter and interpret feedback 
and lessons learned. It is true that DAU's AT&L Knowledge Sharing System (AKSS) is a 
"one stop source for AT&L information," but it is simply a repository of policies, 
documents, reports, briefings, regulations, and a number of other pieces of 
information.119 AKSS is a fantastic Defense Acquisition System resource, but individual 
programs are not mandated to draw from it, as it is merely a website in space.  
Recommendation: The Office of USD (AT&L) should officially engender a 
learning system by going beyond the abstract guidance of “lessons learned” and 
“best practices,” thereby establishing a formal, mandated learning mechanism for 
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the Defense Acquisition System. The superseded DoD Directive 5000.1 The Defense 
Acquisition System, dated October 23, 2000, used to reference a policy that said, 
“Decision makers at all levels shall encourage and facilitate the documentation and 
institutionalization of lessons learned—both good and bad—from past experience.”120 
The dated acquisition policy also went on to state, “Decision makers at all levels should 
encourage a culture friendly to the documentation of valuable lessons learned and the 
sharing of knowledge.”121 The current DoD Directive 5000.1 The Defense Acquisition 
System, dated May 13, 2003, has no such language. 
Regardless of whether abstract policies exist, simply encouraging learning may 
not be good enough. The system likely requires a stronger tact; recall the discussion on 
fit. Thus, a formally sanctioned mechanism—possibly a new organization or an officially 
sanctioned piggy back off of DAU's AKSS—should be responsible for collecting, 
filtering, and interpreting system feedback. Acquisition programs should then be required 
to incorporate the specific lessons learned from this new mechanism wherever possible, 
and formally document their compliances. A set up like this may not be perfect, but it 
might dramatically improve the capability of the system, as a whole, to learn from its 
mistakes and capitalize on its strengths. This initiative would at least give PMs and IPTs 
more consistency and continuity beyond the general guidance 5000 series documents and 
the Defense Acquisition Guidebook.  
D. VARIABILITY OF INPUTS AND COPING 
Conclusion: Chronic patterns of input variability seem to pervade the 
system, which likely cause technology (flow) issues and make the Defense 
Acquisition System less efficient than it needs to be.  Variability simply means, 
“Characterized by variations.”122 This notion of variability is crucial because it is 
anathema to systems, in general. Input variability or randomness, for example, directly 
                                                 
120 Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System, October 23, 2000. 
121 Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System, October 23, 2000. 
122 Merriam-Webster Online, “Variability,” http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/variability (accessed on 
November 18, 2007). 
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contributes to schedule delays and indirectly degrades reliability of systems over time.123 
This is why, for instance, one witnesses stoplights at freeway onramps. Stoplights 
stimulate consistency and facilitate better flow of traffic and allow the freeway system to 
adapt and create dependable flow patterns, thereby avoiding jams.124 Unfortunately, the 
Defense Acquisition System, as a whole, most probably experiences a similar 
phenomenon, where the reverse effect occurs: very little consistency in inputs that foster 
flow (technology) bottlenecks within the system. There are numerous culprits that cause 
variability. Many stem from the usual suspects of the system’s environmental context like 
political forces, budget constraints, and changing threats. These causes of variability are 
pretty much out of the system’s control. Hence, the system chooses to and must deal with 
irrepressible variability by being responsive (Figure 4.1).  
It appears there are two primary sources of input variability the Defense 
Acquisition System attempts to more readily shape and influence, however, specifically 
technological advances and goal (requirement) changes. Inconsistent incorporation of 
technological advances can hurt the Defense Acquisition System’s performance. For 
example, the F/A-22 Raptor program, partly due to its avoidance of an Evolutionary 
Acquisition strategy, had to accommodate vital technological changes throughout the life 
of the program, which caused major delays in schedule and increased costs. 
Technological advances, as helpful as they are in providing enhanced battle space 
capability, trigger change and add complexity—particularly with software-intensive 
programs—thereby increasing variability due to ad hoc assimilation.  
Goal (requirement) changes are another source of input variability. In a February 
2006 briefing sponsored by the International Council on Systems Engineering, 
"Requirements Creep" was labeled as “a landmine…and historically the number one 
program killer!”125 Without a doubt, one of the major challenges affecting the entire 
                                                 
123 Keebom Kang, “GB4410 Logistics Engineering,” (Lecture at the Naval Postgraduate School, 4th 
Quarter, 2007). 
124 Keebom Kang, “GB4410 Logistics Engineering,” (Lecture at the Naval Postgraduate School, 4th 
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Defense Acquisition System is constant re-clarification and massaging of goals 
(requirements) within each of its programs. Solidifying requirements early on in a 
program is crucial. However, this rarely happens effectively, as the necessary restraint 
with the management and containment of requirements gives way to acquiescence and 
permits late changes to system designs, which are especially damaging late in 
development cycles.126 Requirements creep generally leads to schedule delays and cost 
overruns, for which the Defense Acquisition System is stigmatized. 
Recommendation: The Office of USD (AT&L) should continue to embrace 
Evolutionary Acquisition as a preferred strategy to counteract the effects of 
requirement (goal) and technological advancement input variability while looking for 
ways to build in a repeatable process consistency across all programs. Evolutionary 
Acquisition appears to be the best available strategy to balance the technology and 
requirements challenges discussed earlier. However, much like the open nature of the 
Defense Acquisition System, Evolutionary Acquisition concepts are extremely broad and 
abstract, meaning processes and standards differ from program to program. This situation 
runs counter to one of Mintzberg’s five mechanisms for coordinating activities within an 
organization: Standardization of Work Processes.127 
Evolutionary Acquisition methodologies should be clearer and more repeatable to 
reduce variability of the processes that assimilate requirements and technology, i.e., task 
specificity across system programs as well as consistency in program management 
subsystems, i.e., software program management tools. Furthermore, given the need for 
requirements development and consistency discussed earlier, the incremental 
methodology appears to be far superior to the spiral methodology, as the latter method's 
uncertainty fuels inconsistent management techniques. Lastly, refined and unswerving 
practices of Evolutionary Acquisition might materialize via a previously proposed, formal 
learning mechanism. 
                                                 
126 Lee Williams, “The Elements of Technical Requirements,” (Lecture for International Council on 
Systems Engineering, February 21, 2006). 
127 Henry Mintzberg, Mintzberg on Management: Inside Our Strange World of Organizations (New 
York: The Free Press, 1989), 104. 
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E. SPECIFICATION AND DIFFERENTIATION OF TASKS 
Conclusion: Task ambiguity, specifically with differentiation, is a possible 
source of ill-warranted redundancy within the Defense Acquisition System. The 
Roberts organizational systems model urges analysis of task specification and 
differentiation, and it appears that many tasks and terms within the system are confusing 
and redundant, which likely cause much disorder for personnel and organizations within 
the system. For example, what is the difference between program management and risk 
management, system engineering and integration, spiral and incremental methodologies, 
operational assessment and OT&E, or effectiveness and suitability?  
Indeed, most Defense Acquisition System tasks are specified in guidance 
documents—or made up elsewhere—where one can locate rudimentary descriptions and 
explanations of tasks, e.g., program management, risk management, integrated 
scheduling, operational testing, and exit criteria development for a CDR. Hence, one 
might claim tasks are at least specified, on a technicality. However, it is hard to argue 
against the fact that many of the acquisition system’s tasks and terms are not 
differentiated from one another, as many program management tasks involve risk 
management tasks, for example. This most assuredly results in a tremendous amount of 
uncertainty and ambiguity, which possibly forces unnecessary rework and redundancy on 
the part of conscientious system participants. 
Recommendation: The Office of USD (AT&L), or a newly formed formal 
learning mechanism, should commission a thorough scrub of all the specified tasks 
relevant to the Defense Acquisition System and ensure they are prudently 
differentiated and mandated wherever possible.  
F. FINAL ASSESSMENT 
A decade old article in Acquisition Review Quarterly exclaims, “It is clear that 
simplistic, quick-fix approaches or re-circulating old ideas under new labels will not 
suffice," This sentiment underscores the need for a systems approach to improvement of 
 71
the Defense Acquisition System:128 Reformers must proceed with caution because this 
study reveals arbitrary fixes may do more damage to the system than good, especially if 
so-called improvements do not account for the congruence of the interrelationships of the 
system as well as the system's fit within its environmental context.  
Certainly, the Defense Acquisition System is mostly inefficient and partially 
ineffective, but that is its character—and that is okay. It is what it is. At its core, the 
system eventually provides expensive, highly sophisticated equipment and services to 
America’s warfighters in a constrained environment and parochial culture. 
Unquestionably, there is room for improvement, but expectations of the system must be 
realistic and in accordance with sound systematic principles.  
It could take decades for the Defense Acquisition System to become generative 
(Figure 4.1), if at all, because there are so many dependent complexities and variables. 
Certainly, new challenges on the horizon will affect the Defense Acquisition System. For 
example, one of the popular leadership visions circulating throughout the DoD is to 
actualize a “System of Systems” philosophy Department wide in order to mitigate 
replication, enable integrated network communication, and, ultimately, realize cost 
savings.129 Such a grand plan opens an even broader and more complicated menu of 
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